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I.  INTRODUCTION1 
A.  Reasons for this Inquiry 
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission2 was the latest of several 
cases3 in which the Supreme Court has tested federal campaign 
finance laws against the First Amendment of the United States Con-
stitution.  Not discussed in Citizens United, however, is a more funda-
mental question:  Does the Constitution’s scheme of enumerated 
congressional powers grant Congress power to regulate political 
 
 1 Bibliographical Note:  This footnote collects alphabetically the secondary sources cited 
more than once in this Article.  The sources and short form citations used are as follows: 
ANNALS OF CONG. (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (multiple vols.), available at 
http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lwac.html [hereinafter ANNALS OF CONG.]. 
DETERMINATIONS OF THE HONOURABLE HOUSE OF COMMONS, CONCERNING 
ELECTIONS, AND ALL THEIR INCIDENTS (London 1774) [hereinafter DETERMINATIONS]. 
THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION (Merrill 
Jensen et al. eds., 1976) (multiple vols. projected; not all completed) [hereinafter 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY]. 
THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836) (multiple vols.) [hereinafter 
ELLIOT’S DEBATES]. 
THEODORE FOSTER’S MINUTES OF THE CONVENTION HELD AT SOUTH KINGSTON, 
RHODE ISLAND, IN MARCH, 1790 (R.I. Historical Soc’y 1929) [hereinafter FOSTER’S 
MINUTES]. 
THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER 
ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES NOW OR HERETOFORE 
FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909) (multiple 
vols.) [hereinafter FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS]. 
THE FEDERALIST (Alexander Hamilton et al.) (George W. Carey & James McClellan 
eds., 2001) [hereinafter THE FEDERALIST]. 
GARY LAWSON ET AL., THE ORIGINS OF THE NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE (2010) 
[hereinafter LAWSON ET AL., ORIGINS]. 
Robert G. Natelson, The Enumerated Powers of States, 3 NEV. L.J. 469 (2003) [herei-
nafter Natelson, Enumerated]. 
Robert G. Natelson, The Founders’ Hermeneutic:  The Real Original Understanding of 
Original Intent, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1239 (2007) [hereinafter Natelson, Founders’ Hermeneutic]. 
THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (Max Farrand ed., 1937 & 
Supp. 1987) [hereinafter FARRAND’S RECORDS and FARRAND, SUPPLEMENT, respectively]. 
THE REMEMBRANCER; OR, IMPARTIAL REPOSITORY OF PUBLIC EVENTS (London 1775–
84) (multiple vols.) [hereinafter THE REMEMBRANCER]. 
 2 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
 3 McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003) (largely sustaining campaign 
finance laws); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (partly sustaining campaign finance 
laws); cf. United States v. Cong. of Indus. Orgs., 335 U.S. 106, 120–24 (1948) (finding it 
unnecessary to reach First Amendment issues, but sustaining the holding of the lower 
court, which had invalidated an early federal campaign law on First Amendment 
grounds). 
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campaigns at all?  If not, such regulations are, of course, invalid, and 
it is unnecessary to consider First Amendment issues.4 
The reputed basis for federal authority over congressional cam-
paigns is the enumerated power granted by Article I, Section 4, 
Clause 15 and its incidents under the Necessary and Proper Clause.6  
The modern Supreme Court sometimes calls Article I, Section 4, 
Clause 1 the “Elections Clause,”7  but it is more accurately called the 
“Times, Places and Manner Clause,” since it is only one of many con-
stitutional provisions governing elections.8 
In this Article, I report on my investigation into the scope of con-
gressional power under the Times, Places and Manner Clause, ac-
cording to its original understanding and meaning.  I designed this 
investigation to be objective; in other words, unlike much constitu-
tional writing, this is not a brief for or against particular laws, propos-
als, or modes of interpretation.9 
 
 4 But see Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 545–46 (1934) (recognizing, in an opi-
nion by Justice Sutherland, an apparently extra-constitutional power in Congress to regu-
late presidential elections).  The Burroughs reasoning bears some similarity to the more 
famous Sutherland “inherent sovereign authority” opinion in United States v. Curtiss-Wright 
Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 317–18 (1936).  However, the doctrine of extra-constitutional 
powers in the federal government is contradicted by the wording of the Tenth Amend-
ment.  See Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 89–90 (1907). 
 5 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (“The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for 
Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; 
but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the 
Places of chusing [sic] Senators.”). 
 6 Id. § 8, cl. 18 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o make all Laws which shall be ne-
cessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Pow-
ers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Depart-
ment or Officer thereof.”). 
 7 E.g., McConnell, 540 U.S. at 134. 
 8 There are at least eleven other “elections clauses.”  See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cls. 2, 3 
(describing the procedure for presidential elections); id. amend. XII (revising that pro-
cedure); id. amend. XV, § 1 (preventing discrimination in voting based on “race, color, or 
previous condition of servitude”); id. amend. XVII (providing for direct election of U.S. 
Senators); id. amend. XIX (preventing discrimination in voting based on sex); id. amend. 
XX (term-limiting the President); id. amend. XXIII, § 1 (allowing electors in the District 
of Columbia to vote for presidential electors); id. amend. XXIV, § 1 (banning discrimina-
tion in voting based on payment of tax); id. amend. XXV, § 2 (providing for election of a 
Vice President to fill a vacancy); id. amend. XXVI, § 1 (limiting age discrimination in vot-
ing).  As made clear later in the text, constitutional provisions governing qualifications 
for and terms of office may be added to the list.  E.g., id. art. I, § 2, cls. 1–3 (providing for 
qualifications of electors and members of the House of Representatives and for allocation 
of Representatives among states). 
 9 On the defects in “originalist” writings caused by the desire of legal writers to argue a 
cause rather than engage in honest historical investigation, see Henry P. Monaghan, Our 
Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 377–78 (1981). 
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B. Text and Post-Founding History 
The text of the Times, Places and Manner Clause is as follows:   
“The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and 
Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature the-
reof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regula-
tions, except as to the Places of chusing [sic] Senators.”10 
As this provision seems to contemplate, historically the states have 
been the chief regulators of congressional elections.  Yet Congress 
has intervened on important occasions.  The first time was in 1842, 
when Congress mandated that states electing more than one member 
of the House of Representatives do so by districts rather than at-
large.11  Congress enacted other regulatory statutes during the Recon-
struction Era12 and at various points during the twentieth century.13  
The most recent interventions are the Help America Vote Act14 and 
the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act,15 both adopted in 2002.  The 
last was partially invalidated by Citizens United.  With few exceptions,16 
the purported basis for these statutes was the Times, Places and Man-
ner Clause. 
Although the Supreme Court has heard several challenges to 
these statutes,17 it never has examined thoroughly the intended scope 
 
 10 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. 
 11 1842 Apportionment Act, ch. 47, 5 Stat. 491. 
 12 Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140; Force Act of 1871, ch. 99, 16 Stat. 433; Ku 
Klux Klan Act of 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13. 
 13 E.g., Tillman Act, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864 (1907); Federal Corrupt Practices Act, ch. 368, 43 
Stat. 1070 (1925) (adopted in its initial form in 1910 as 36 Stat. 822); Federal Election 
Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of U.S.C.); National Voter Registration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-31, 107 
Stat. 77 (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg (2006)). 
 14 Help America Vote Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 (codified as amended 
in 42 U.S.C. § 15301 (2006)). 
 15 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.). 
 16 The Reconstruction Era laws, see sources cited supra note 12, were adopted wholly or en-
tirely under the powers given Congress by the U.S. Constitution’s Fourteenth and Fif-
teenth Amendments.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5; id. amend. XV, § 2.  United States v. 
Wurzbach, 280 U.S. 396 (1930), sustained the application to federal employees of the Fed-
eral Corrupt Practices Act, 43 Stat. 1070, as justified by congressional implied powers over 
federal employees.  It declined to reach the issue of whether the Act was within the scope 
of the Times, Places and Manner Clause.  Wurzbach, 280 U.S. at 396. 
 17 E.g., McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 
1 (1976); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941); Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355 
(1932); Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232 (1921); United States v. Gradwell, 243 
U.S. 476 (1917); Ex parte Yarbrough (Ku-Klux Cases), 110 U.S. 651 (1884); United States 
v. Gale, 109 U.S. 65 (1883); Ex parte Clarke, 100 U.S. 399 (1879); Ex parte Siebold, 100 
U.S. 371 (1879). 
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of the congressional power under the Times, Places and Manner 
Clause.  Some of the Court’s pronouncements have asserted exten-
sive congressional power without citing much authority.18  Others 
have asserted extensive congressional power while relying only on 
cases that themselves cited little authority.19  Occasionally, the Court 
has derived conclusions about eighteenth-century understanding 
from fragmentary evidence of scant probative value, as when it relied 
on the definition of “election” appearing in a nineteenth-century dic-
tionary.20 
In only one case, Newberry v. United States,21 a 1921 decision written 
by Justice McReynolds, has the Court made some effort to reconstruct 
the Founding-Era record—and the results were distinctly different 
from the results of the Court’s other cases.22  The issue in Newberry was 
whether the Times, Places and Manner Clause was broad enough to 
authorize Congress to regulate primary elections as well as general 
elections.  The Court concluded that the power was not sufficiently 
broad.  Justice Pitney, writing for himself and two colleagues, dis-
sented from that part of the opinion; but as has been true of other 
justices taking an expansive view of the Clause, he cited little Found-
ing-Era material.23  When the Court overruled Newberry two decades 
later, it relied on Pitney’s Newberry opinion, citing no additional 
Founding-Era evidence.24 
Not even the Newberry Court’s survey of the evidence was particu-
larly thorough.  For example, the Court did not discuss eighteenth-
 
 18 The treatment of Founding-Era understanding in Yarbrough, 110 U.S. at 660–61, was 
summary, as was that in Classic, 313 U.S. at 317–18.  Other cases construing or applying 
the Times, Places and Manner Clause have not examined the Founding-Era understand-
ing at all.  See, e.g., McConnell, 540 U.S. at 93; Siebold, 100 U.S. at 371. 
 19 E.g., Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14 n.16 (citing cases); Smiley, 285 U.S. at 366–67 (citing cases, 
some not relevant); Gradwell, 243 U.S. at 482 (citing cases); Gale, 109 U.S. at 66 (citing 
cases). 
 20 Foster v. Love, 522 U.S. 67, 71 (1997). 
 21 256 U.S. at 232. 
 22 Id. at 250–51, 255–56. 
 23 However, he did deal briefly with some of the majority’s arguments based on the Federal-
ist Papers.  Id. at 283–91 (discussing The Federalist No. 60 (Alexander Hamilton), supra 
note 1). 
 24 United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941).  The Court in Classic actually said it was un-
necessary to overrule Newberry because Justice McReynold’s decision spoke for only four 
justices.  Id. at 317.  However, Justice McKenna (the fifth vote) had concurred with the 
portion of the opinion construing the original meaning of the Times, Places and Manner 
Clause, so it really was an overruling.  Newberry, 256 U.S. at 258.  Justice Stone’s opinion 
for the Court in Classic promised a review of “the words of the Constitution read in their 
historical setting as revealing the purpose of its framers,” but failed to deliver.  Classic, 313 
U.S. at 317. 
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century election laws, understandings, or practices.  Moreover, as ex-
plained below, the Newberry conclusion was erroneous.25 
Scholarly commentary on the original understanding or original 
meaning of the Times, Places and Manner Clause has been brief and 
usually has marshaled Founding-Era sources primarily to serve a larg-
er argument.  The most complete examination, by Professor Stephen 
J. Safranek, appeared in an article contending for the constitutionali-
ty of a Colorado term-limits initiative.26  Professor Safranek relied on 
the ratification-era debates to conclude that the Constitution’s reser-
vation to the states of power to regulate the “manner” of elections was 
broad enough to justify application of the term-limits initiative to 
congressional candidates.27  Similarly, a student author used the same 
sort of material to construct a case for the constitutionality of the Na-
tional Voter Registration Act.28  Although neither of those treatments 
was truly comprehensive, others have been even briefer.29 
C. The Interpretive Method Employed in this Article and the Evidence of 
Original Public Meaning 
In order to recreate the original force of the Times, Places and 
Manner Clause, one must take account of maxims of textual interpre-
 
 25 Infra note 209 and accompanying text. 
 26 Stephen J. Safranek, Term Limitations:  Do the Winds of Change Blow Unconstitutional?, 26 
CREIGHTON L. REV. 321, 327–43 (1993). 
 27 The analysis would seem unnecessary since the Tenth Amendment reserves all undele-
gated power to the states and people; hence, state regulations, unlike congressional regu-
lations, should not be confined by the constitutional meaning of “Manner of holding 
Elections.”  Cf. U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by 
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, 
or to the people.”).  There is no requirement that states actually have been exercising a 
power (in this case, control over federal elections) at the time the Tenth Amendment was 
adopted for that power to be reserved; otherwise, any police power unexercisable in 1791 
(e.g., regulation of automobiles) could not be exercised today.  Nevertheless, current Su-
preme Court doctrine is that the “grant” to states by the Times, Places and Manner 
Clause is their exclusive source of authority over federal elections.  See, e.g., Clingman v. 
Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 586 (2005); Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510, 523–24 (2001) (following 
U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995)); cf.  Newberry, 256 U.S. at 281 (Pitney, 
J., concurring in part). 
 28 Kevin K. Green, Note, A Vote Properly Cast?  The Constitutionality of the National Voter Registra-
tion Act of 1993, 22 J. LEGIS. 45, 51–60 (1996) (discussing National Voter Registration Act 
of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-31, 107 Stat. 77 (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg 
(2006)). 
 29 E.g., Philip A. Hamburger, The Constitution’s Accommodation of Social Change, 88 MICH. L. 
REV. 239, 289–90 (1989) (citing the Clause in arguing how the Founders’ designed the 
Constitution to respond to social change); Vasan Kesavan, Is the Electoral Count Act Uncons-
titutional?, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1653, 1750–51 (2002); Anthony Peacock, Election Regulations, in 
THE HERITAGE GUIDE TO THE CONSTITUTION 71–73 (Edwin Meese III et al. eds., 2005).   
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tation current in the eighteenth century.  Modern commentators 
tend to be skeptical of such maxims, but in the Founding Era, judi-
cially-approved rules of construction enjoyed great standing.30 
Among the most important of the interpretive rules was that tex-
tual uncertainties in a document (including a constitution) should be 
resolved in accordance with “the intent of the makers.”31  In the con-
stitutional context, the “makers” were the ratifiers, and their “intent” 
was their subjective understanding.32  If the subjective understanding 
(which I refer to in this Article as original understanding) was either 
not recoverable or not coherent, then one marshaled available evi-
dence to infer an objective substitute for subjective intent—a con-
struct modern writers call the original public meaning.33  The original 
public meaning is defined as how the text “would have been unders-
tood by a hypothetical, objective, reasonably well-informed reader”34 
at the time of ratification. 
A person employing the Founding-Era interpretive method may 
begin either with evidence of original understanding, filling any gaps 
with evidence of public meaning, or with evidence of public meaning, 
amending it with any inconsistent understandings.  The ultimate re-
sult of the inquiry should be the same using either method.  In my 
investigation, I began by seeking evidence of original public meaning.  
For the Times, Places and Manner Clause, that evidence encom-
passes: 
 Contemporaneous writings referencing the “manner” of elections; 
 British parliamentary statutes regulating the times, places, and man-
ner of elections (as former British subjects knowledgeable in the law 
 
 30 1 THOMAS WOOD, AN INSTITUTE OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 6 (1772) (“Maxims . . . are of 
the same Strength as Acts of Parliament when once the Judges have determined what is a 
Maxim . . . .”);  accord State v. ____, 2 N.C. 28, 1794 WL 87 (N.C. Super. L. & Eq. 1794). 
 31 Natelson, Founders’ Hermeneutic, supra note 1, at 1249–55. 
 32 Id. at 1288–89 (citation omitted)(internal quotation marks omitted), 1297–03. 
 33 Id. at 1286. 
 34 See Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution’s Secret 
Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1132 (2003) (“[H]ow the words and phrases, and 
structure (and sometimes even the punctuation marks!) would have been understood by 
a hypothetical, objective, reasonably well-informed reader of those words and phrases, in 
context, at the time they were adopted, and within the political and linguistic community 
in which they were adopted. . . . We call this approach original, objective-public-meaning tex-
tualism.” (citations omitted)).  Kesavan and Paulsen offer this definition as part of the 
common argument that constitutional interpretation should be guided by original mean-
ing textualism rather than by original intent of the drafters or original understanding of 
the ratifiers.  After Kesavan and Paulsen wrote, however, I undertook a review of eigh-
teenth-century interpretive method that left little doubt that the Founders granted origi-
nal understanding (when coherent and available) primacy over original meaning.  See 
generally Natelson, Founders’ Hermeneutic, supra note 1. 
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of the British Empire, the Founders were familiar with British election 
laws and discussed them during the ratification controversy);35 
 Provisions in contemporaneous state constitutions regulating the 
times, place, and manner of elections; 
 Early state statutes designed to comply with the mandate of the Times, 
Places and Manner Clause.  This category includes only statutes (a) 
adopted by states that already had ratified the Constitution (b) during 
the period before all the original thirteen had ratified—i.e., before 
Rhode Island’s ratification on May 29, 1790; and 
 The drafting, text, and structure of the Constitution. 
After collecting evidence of original public meaning, I then 
turned to the ratification record to determine if the ratifiers adopted 
any special understandings inconsistent with the original public 
meaning.  I concluded that the ratifiers’ understanding did not differ 
from the original public meaning, except in one particular:  The 
conventions of several states ratified only after being assured—and in 
some cases stating the understanding explicitly—that congressional 
power under the Times, Places and Manner Clause would be con-
strued narrowly. 
II.  THE “MANNER OF ELECTION” IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 
A.  Documents Referenced 
Eighteenth-century English-language writings contain many oc-
currences of the phrase “manner of election,” and some occurrences 
of its synonym, “mode of election.”36  A Gale Company database, Eigh-
teenth-Century Collections Online, contains a fairly good sample of these, 
although I found numerous instances elsewhere as well.  My conclu-
sions of original meaning were based on documents that (1) referred 
to the “manner” or “mode” of election, (2) offered illustrations of 
what the phrase meant, (3) were prepared prior to May 29, 1790, the 
 
 35 For example, participants in the ratification debates often referred to an incident in 
which Parliament had lengthened terms in the House of Commons from three to seven 
years.  E.g., Agrippa, Letter XIII, MASS. GAZETTE, Jan. 22, 1788, reprinted in 5 DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY, supra note 1, at 770 (referring to “the usurpation by which they continued 
themselves from three to seven years”). 
 36 For references to the “mode of election,” see, e.g., 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 52 
(reporting remarks by Samuel Spencer at the North Carolina ratifying convention); 
FOSTER’S MINUTES, supra note 1, at 44 (quoting John Sayles at the first sitting of the 
Rhode Island ratifying convention as using “Mode of Election” when discussing the 
Times, Places and Manner Clause); and Ordinance of the Convention of New-York, for 
Settling the New Form of Government of that State (May 8, 1777), in THE 
REMEMBRANCER, supra note 1, at 238, 240.  See also infra notes 66 & 69; cf. FOSTER’S 
MINUTES, supra note 1, at 88 (referring to the  “Mode of Putting the Vote”).   
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day Rhode Island became the thirteenth state to ratify the Constitu-
tion, and (4) were prepared within the geographic limits of what had 
been Great Britain’s Atlantic empire—that is, England, Scotland, 
Ireland, and (before 1776) British North America.  Some of the doc-
uments are discussed in the text below while others are referenced 
only in footnotes. 
B.  Documents from England, Scotland, and Ireland 
The Royal Charter of the Dublin Society37 stated that the Society’s 
“manner of election” included time limits, qualifications, and a pro-
cedure for selecting a voting place.38  William Coxe’s English work, 
Sketches of the Natural, Civil, and Political State of Swisserland39 [sic] de-
scribed “[t]he manner of election” for office in a Swiss canton as in-
volving popular election of five candidates, and choice of a final vic-
tor from them by lot.  Similarly, Philip Morant described the “manner 
of election” of an English mayor as involving an election by the bur-
gesses, “or the major part of them, in common Hall assembled [who] 
nominated and returned two Aldermen to the bench of Aldermen:  
who, retiring into the Council, or Record-room, chose one of the two 
to be Mayor for the year ensuing.”40  Rules pertaining to the “manner 
of election” in London prescribed the election of candidates from 
districts, the qualifications of the electorate, the choice of candidate, 
and methods of certification.41  A History of Great Yarmouth described 
 
 37 The Royal Charter of the Dublin Society (1785). 
 38 Id. at 5, 7, 9 (providing for “such others as shall from Time to Time be elected in the 
Manner herein after directed,” and stating that the aforesaid “Manner” was that the 
members designated “within forty Days next after the Date of this our Grant, to meet to-
gether at such Time and Place . . . to the said Members, or such of them as live within our 
City, or Liberties of our City of Dublin . . . where they, or the major Part of them then 
present, may nominate, elect and chuse [sic] new Members” and “that the said Corpora-
tion, or any seven or more of them, whereof the President, or one of the Vice-Presidents, 
to be one, shall have full Power to elect such Persons to be Members of the said Society”). 
 39 WILLIAM COXE, SKETCHES OF THE NATURAL, CIVIL, AND POLITICAL STATE OF SWISSERLAND 
54 (1779) (referring to election in a Swiss canton); see also AEOLUS:  OR, THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICIAN 30 (1770) (stating, “Plutarch goes on—‘The manner of 
their Election was as follows[]’” and further stating that the people were called together, 
locked together in a room so they could not see outside, and generally decided according 
to shouts of the people); REV. T. WILSON, AN ARCHAEOLOGICAL DICTIONARY 234 (1783) 
(stating that “the manner of their election” was drawing by lots from a particular body). 
 40 1 PHILIP MORANT, THE HISTORY AND ANTIQUITIES OF THE COUNTY OF ESSEX 98 (London, 
1768). 
 41 THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS, RIGHTS, LIBERTIES, AND PRIVILEGES, OF THE CITY OF LONDON 39–
40 (1779) (“[T]he manner of which election has several times varied:  but in the year 
1714 . . . it was enacted, that . . . there shall be chosen only one citizen by the inhabitants 
of every ward destitute of an alderman, and the person so elected to be returned by the 
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the “[m]anner of electing, sending, and receiving the Port Bailiffs” as 
involving an election in June or July by the common assemblies of the 
particular towns whose turn it was to send [the Port Bailiffs],” fol-
lowed by presentation  
to the general assembly of the Cinque Ports, and the towns of Rye 
and Winchelsea, on Tuesday after the feast of St. Margaret, to be by 
them approved, acknowledged, confirmed, and deputed . . . . And 
if any objection appeared to either of the persons elected, an order 
was given for another to be elected in his stead.42 
To a considerable extent, Parliament had standardized regula-
tions for the “manner of election” to the House of Commons.  Par-
liamentary legislation governing the choice of burgesses prescribed 
public notice and proclamations, times and places of voting, the 
identity, duties, and oaths of the supervising officers, viva voce voting 
(alterable to secret ballot if the assembled voters requested it), gen-
eration and retention of a list of qualified and disqualified voters, ad-
judication of disputed elections, and punishment for selling one’s 
vote.43  The “Manner of the Election of Knights” to the Commons also 
included provisions for the forms and substance of writs, proclama-
tions, times, and for a written and sealed ballot.44 
 
lord mayor (or other returning officer, duly qualified to hold a court of wardmore) to the 
court of lord-mayor and aldermen, by whom the person so returned is to be admitted, 
and sworn into the office of alderman.”); see also CHARLES BURLINGTON ET AL, THE 
MODERN UNIVERSAL BRITISH TRAVELLER [sic] 264 (1779) (stating that the Lord-Mayor of 
London “is elected in the following manner” and that the livery chose two aldermen, the 
body of aldermen selected one from them, the chancellor gave his approval, and the de-
signee was sworn in). 
 42 THE HISTORY OF GREAT YARMOUTH 269–70 (1776). 
 43 E.g., DETERMINATIONS, supra note 1, at 42–79; see also 4 JOHN COMYNS, A DIGEST OF THE 
LAWS OF ENGLAND 330–32, 557 (1780) (indexing the “Manner of Election” for Burgesses 
in Parliament to include proclamation, voting in person, sheriff as officer in charge, 
hours of voting, time of voting, place of voting, voting either “by Hearing of the Voices, or 
View of the Hands held up” provision for a poll (secret ballot), appointment and duties 
of clerk, swearing of clerks, naming of inspectors, timely process, delivery of a copy of the 
poll to anyone who desired and paid for it, delivery of “check-books” to the clerk of the 
peace, erection of polling booths, and the requirement that the sheriff list the towns from 
which each booth was appointed and deliver a copy of the list to any candidate on re-
quest); A GENTLEMAN OF THE INNER-TEMPLE, LAWS CONCERNING THE ELECTION OF 
MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT 84 (1774) (reporting that the “Manner of Election” referred to 
the Sheriff receiving an election writ and directing election of commissioners, who then 
chose representatives in Parliament). 
 44 1 THE STATUTES AT LARGE 469–70 (1768–70) (mentioning and giving, in 8 Hen. IV, c. 
XV, “The Manner of the Election of Knights of Shires for a Parliament,” the form of the 
writ, proclamation of day and place of Parliament and of election of knights, free election 
of the full county, and the names of persons chosen to be written in an indenture under 
seals of those who chose them). 
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This standardization was not complete, however.  The “manner of 
election” to the Commons varied somewhat according to locale.  
John Impey’s treatise The Office of Sheriff explained that in Scotland 
also the “manner” included provision for writs of election, oaths ad-
ministered to electors, designation of the sheriff as the officer who 
gave notice of the time of election, the meeting of freeholder-
electors, returns of elections, and punishment for defaulting offi-
cials.45  Scotland differed from England in that the Scottish “manner 
of election” to the House of Commons often was indirect—that is, the 
voters chose “commissioners” who actually elected the Member of 
Parliament.46  The “manner of election” varied in Ireland as well.47 
These English, Scottish, and Irish sources used the phrase “man-
ner of election” to encompass the times, places, and mechanics of 
voting; legislative districting; provisions for registration lists; the qua-
lifications of electors and elected; strictures against election-day mis-
conduct; and the rules of decision (majority, plurality, or lot).  “Man-
ner of election” included regulation of elections decided in two tiers, 
as when one group chose electors and the electors chose the winner, 
or when a group selected several candidates and the winner was cho-
sen by lot.  However, regulations of the “manner of election” in these 
documents seem not to have included governance of campaigns. 
C.  “Manner of Election” in America 
Americans ascribed the same general content to the phrase 
“manner of election” as the English, Irish, and Scots did.  The Trans-
actions of Benjamin Franklin’s American Philosophical Society pro-
vided for the “manner of . . . election” of officers, and for the time 
and place of election, notice to electors one week before the election, 
 
 45 JOHN IMPEY, THE OFFICE OF SHERIFF 303–10 (1786); see also GEORGE CHALMERS, THE 
HISTORY OF THE UNION BETWEEN ENGLAND AND SCOTLAND 498 (1786) (describing pro-
ceedings of Scottish Parliament on Jan. 29, 1707, as determining the “manner in which 
the burrows shall elect their representatives to the House of Commons of Great Britain” 
to include districting for election of Scots representatives); DETERMINATIONS, supra note 
1, at 82–84 (providing for “[t]he Manner of & Proceeding at the Election of the Com-
moners for Scotland” to include writs of election, precepts to boroughs to elect commis-
sioners, punishment for defaulting sheriff, punishment for defaulting chief magistrate of 
borough, summoning council of the borough, appointment of day for election, and pre-
scribing two days between the date on which the time of election was appointed and the 
actual election of commissioners and commissioners’ election of the member of Parlia-
ment). 
 46 Id. 
 47 9 THE STATUTES AT LARGE, PASSED IN THE PARLIAMENTS HELD IN IRELAND 68 (1786) (sta-
tute passed in 1763, referring as the “same manner of election” a master gathering to-
gether a minimum number of voters and their election). 
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choice of election judges, appointment of secretaries for recording 
the names of voters, voting by ballot or written ticket rather than viva 
voce, and for breaking tie votes by lot.48  A 1721 South Carolina elec-
tion code described “the Manner and Form of electing Members” to 
the lower house of the colonial assembly as including the qualifica-
tions of office-holders and the freedom of voters from civil process on 
election days. Within the code also were provisions for writs of elec-
tion, times for elections, oaths and enrollment of electors, the choice 
of election managers and the conduct of voter assemblies (which 
were to continue for no more than two days).  Voting was by paper 
ballot.  Ballots were deposited in designated boxes, which were then 
sealed.  Double ballots were invalid.  The winner was determined by a 
majority rather than a plurality.  The code specified punishment for 
corrupt election officials and persons who disrupted elections.49 
Connecticut’s royal charter provided that there was to be “One 
Governor, One Deputy-Governor, and Twelve Assistants, to be from 
time to Time constituted, elected and chosen out of the Freemen of 
the said Company for the Time being, in such Manner and Form as he-
reafter in these Presents is expressed.”50  The “Manner and Form” in-
cluded meetings of the citizens on the second Thursday of October 
and the second Thursday of May, and selection by majority votes of 
two persons in each “Place, Town, or City” to serve in the General As-
 
 48 2 TRANSACTIONS OF THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY vi–vii (1786).  For another 
example of “manner” as including the method of balloting in a private organization, see 
THE LIFE AND ADVENTURES OF MR. BAMPFYLDE-MOORE CAREW 48 (1786), describing an 
imaginary “manner of election” by which the voter puts a white ball in the box designated 
for his candidate and a black ball in the other candidates’ boxes. 
 49 S.C. STAT, 113–15 (1721) (“An Act to ascertain the Manner and Form of electing Mem-
bers . . . in the Commons House of Assembly.”). 
 50 CHARTER OF CONN. 1662, reprinted in 1 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 1, 
at 530 (emphasis added).  The charter stated as follows: 
[T]here shall be One Governor, One Deputy-Governor, and Twelve Assistants, to 
be from time to Time constituted, elected and chosen out of the Freemen of the 
said Company for the Time being, in such Manner and Form as hereafter in these 
Presents is expressed, . . . And further we . . . Do ordain and grant, That the Gov-
ernor . . . shall and may from Time to Time upon all Occasions, give Order for the 
assembling of the said Company, and calling them together to consult and advise 
of the Business and Affairs of the said Company, and that for ever hereafter, twice 
in every Year, That is to say, On every Second Thursday in October, and on every 
Second Thursday in May, or oftener in case it shall be requisite; the Assistants, and 
Freemen of the said Company, or such of them (not exceeding Two Persons from 
each Place, Town, or City) who shall be from Time to Time hereunto elected or 
deputed by the major Part of the Freemen of the respective Towns, Cities, and 
Places for which they shall be elected or deputed, shall have a General Meeting or 
Assembly . . . whereof the Governor of Deputy-Governor, and Six of the Assistants 
at least, to be Seven, shall be called the General Assembly, and shall have full Pow-
er and authority to alter and change their Days and Times of Meeting . 
  Id. at 530–31. 
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sembly, which in turn was to elect the governor.  The charter of 
Rhode Island prescribed “manner” regulations of the same general 
kind.51 
After independence, Connecticut and Rhode Island continued to 
operate under their charters, with some amendments.  The other 
states drafted new constitutions for themselves.  Several of these con-
stitutions explicitly regulated the “manner” of elections.  The provi-
sions governing “manner of election” varied in scope, although their 
subject-matter was generally consistent.  The Constitution of North 
Carolina provided that the “manner” of election of delegates to the 
Continental Congress would be for them to be “chosen annually by 
the General Assembly, by ballot; but may be superseded [i.e., re-
placed in office], in the mean time, in the same manner.”52  Georgia’s 
“manner” rules for selecting state representatives were as follows: 
The manner of electing representatives shall be by ballot, and shall be 
taken by two or more justices of the peace, in each county, who shall pro-
vide a convenient box for receiving the said ballots; and, on closing the 
poll, the ballots shall be compared in public with the list of votes that 
have been taken, and the majority immediately declared; a certificate of 
the same being given to the persons elected, and also a certificate re-
turned to the house of representatives.53 
The 1780 Massachusetts Constitution described the “manner” by 
mandating the time of election (annually, on the first Monday of 
April), property and age qualifications of electors, a notice of elec-
tion, and who would serve as election judges.54  It also required that 
the “Legislature shall, by standing laws, direct the time and manner 
of convening the electors, and of collecting votes, and of certifying to 
the Governor the officers elected.”55  The “manner” regulations in 
Maryland’s constitution56 included voter qualifications,57 time and 
frequency of elections,58 the identity of the election judges,59 viva voce 
majority voting for senatorial electors,60 secret ballot plurality voting 
 
 51 CHARTER OF R.I. AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS 1663, reprinted in 6 FEDERAL AND STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 1, at 3215. 
 52 N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. XXXVII, reprinted in 5 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, su-
pra note 1, at 2793.   
 53 GA. CONST. OF 1777, art. XIII, reprinted in 2 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra 
note 1, at 780.   
 54 MASS. CONST. of 1780, ch. 1, § 2, arts. II, IV (setting forth manner of election for state 
senators). 
 55 Id. ch. 2, § 1, art. X. 
 56 MD. CONST. of 1776. 
 57 Id. arts. II, IV, XII. 
 58 Id. arts. II, XIV (one and five years for different legislative houses). 
 59 Id. arts. VI, IX, XVII. 
 60 Id. art. XIV. 
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among those electors for senators,61 and oaths for electors.62  The New 
Hampshire constitution provided for election to the state council “in 
the following manner,” and then specified how many council mem-
bers were to come from each county.63  The “manner” of electing the 
governor of New Jersey was by a majority vote of a joint ballot of the 
two legislative houses, with service for a one-year term.64  The consti-
tutions of the other states all defined the manner of election in ways 
consistent with the illustrations just given.65 
State election laws adopted after Independence employed “man-
ner of election” and its variants in the same general way.  The “mode 
of holding elections” in a 1777 New York statute66 provided for public 
notice at least ten days before election in each county for elections 
for governor, lieutenant-governor, and senate.  It specified the places 
for election, the supervising officers and election judges, times of no-
 
 61 Id. arts. XV, XVI. 
 62 Id. art. XVIII. 
 63 N.H. CONST. of 1776. 
 64 Article VII of The New Jersey Constitution of 1776 provides: 
VII.  That the Council and Assembly jointly, at their first meeting after each an-
nual election, shall, by a majority of votes, elect some fit person within the Colony, 
to be Governor for one year, who shall be constant President of the Council, and 
have a casting vote in their proceedings; and that the Council themselves shall 
choose a Vice-President who shall act as such in the absence of the Governor. 
  N.J. CONST. of 1776 art. VII.  Article XII provides: 
XII.  That the Judges of the Supreme Court shall continue in office for seven 
years: the Judges of the Inferior Court of Common Pleas in the several counties, 
Justices of the Peace, Clerks of the Supreme Court, Clerks of the Inferior Court of 
Common Pleas and Quarter Sessions, the Attorney-General, and Provincial Secre-
tary, shall continue in office for five years:  and the Provincial Treasurer shall con-
tinue in office for one year; and that they shall be severally appointed by the 
Council and Assembly, in manner aforesaid. 
  N.J. CONST. of 1776 art. XII (emphasis added). 
 65 DEL. CONST. of 1776, art. 27 (specifying “manner” to include choice of election inspectors 
and assessors and use of secret ballot); N.Y. CONST. of 1777, arts. VI–VII, X, XII (prescrib-
ing “manner and form” of election by viva voce or by ballot; providing for “election of 
senators . . . after this manner,” and dividing states into senatorial districts, proportioning 
by census, electing by freeholders, and providing term limits); PA. CONST. of 1776, § 19 
(providing for “manner” and “mode” of electing supreme executive council: districting 
the state and selection by ballot by freemen for particular terms); S.C. CONST. of 1778, 
arts. XXVII–XXIX (including in “manner” of elections the choice by ballot, term of office 
and identity of electors); S.C. CONST. of 1776, arts. II, III, XIII, XXI, XXVII (providing for 
“manner” of election of legislative council, state president, and sheriffs, including selec-
tion by ballot, quorum, and qualification of electors); VT. CONST. of 1786, ch. II, arts. VII, 
X (similarly outlining “manner” of elections); VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. II, §§ XVI, XVII, 
XLIV (including in “manner” of elections the choice of two representatives from each 
town, frequency of elections, ballot voting, sealing of ballots, vote counting, majority vot-
ing); VA. CONST. of 1776 (including in “manner” of elections legislative districting, quali-
fications of voters, returns by election officers, and terms of office). 
 66 Ordinance of the Convention of New-York, for Settling the New Form of Government of 
that State (May 8, 1777), in THE REMEMBRANCER, supra note 1, at 238–43. 
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tice, returns of poll lists, declaration of winner, and some voter quali-
fications.67 
A 1781 Maryland law mandated that certain special elections “be 
held in county in manner and form following,” and prescribed the 
time and place of election, the issuance of notice, the formalities per-
taining to election officials, the administration of oaths, the an-
nouncement of the results, and that a plurality should determine the 
victor.68  A 1787 New York statute prescribed as the “Mode of con-
ducting every such Election,” the delivery of a paper ballot with the 
names of the candidates, the voter’s receipt of the ballot in the pres-
ence of inspectors, the folding and closing of the ballot, its placement 
in a box to be locked, who was to keep the key, inspection of the poll 
lists, protection of ballot boxes, the disposition of voter challenges, 
oaths to voters of questionable loyalty, the opening and counting of 
ballots, the punishment of corrupt officials and of persons disrupting 
an election, and the qualifications of voters.69  In this particular sta-
tute, the location of the voting was designated separately.70  States that 
did not use the precise phrase “manner [or mode] of election” 
adopted analogous measures.71 
By its terms, the Constitution was to come into effect upon ratifi-
cation by nine states.72  While the Constitution was still pending else-
where, some of the ratifying states adopted statutes whose recited 
purpose was to comply with the state’s duty under Article I, Section 4 
to prescribe the times, places, and manner of election.73  The South 
 
 67 Id. at 241–42. 
 68 An Act for Holding Special Elections in Caecil County, 1781 Md. Laws, ch. IX; see also An 
Act to Alter the Place of Holding the Elections for Members of the Legislature, and Pa-
rish Officers for the Parish of Saint John, Colleton County (Feb. 27, 1788), reprinted in 
PUBLIC LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA 440 (1790). 
 69 An Act for Regulating Elections (Feb. 13, 1787), § VI, reprinted in 2 LAWS OF THE STATE OF 
NEW YORK 27, 29–30 (1789). 
 70 Id. 
 71 See, e.g., An Act Concerning Election of Members of General Assembly (Dec. 20, 1785) 
reprinted in A COLLECTION OF ALL SUCH ACTS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF VIRGINIA 22–
26 (1790) (specifying qualifications of electors, a fine for failing to vote, privilege from 
arrest for voters, secret polls if live voting was not practical, extension of voting up to four 
days, resolution of conflicts, the oath for electors, the form of certification of election, 
writs of election in the event an office was vacant, punishment for a disobedient sheriff, 
and punishment for those who buy votes). 
 72 U.S. CONST. art. VII, cl. 1. 
 73 An Act for Prescribing on the Part of this State, the Times, Places, and Manner of Hold-
ing Elections for Representatives in the Congress, and the Manner of Appointing Electors 
of a President of the United States (Nov. 4, 1788), reprinted in PUBLIC LAWS OF SOUTH 
CAROLINA 462 (1790); see also An Act Directing the Times, Places and Manner of Electing 
Representatives in this State, for the House of Representatives of the Congress of the 
United States of America (Jan. 27, 1789), 1789 N.Y. Laws, c. XI, reprinted in 2 LAWS OF THE 
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Carolina measure, for example,74 divided the state into five districts, 
with one federal Representative to be elected by a plurality in each 
district.  The law also provided that the place of election was to be the 
same as for the state house, and that the election was to be regulated 
and conducted under the same rules.  The law identified the con-
ducting officials, specified how they were to make returns, and re-
quired examination of the returns by the governor.  It provided for 
proclamation of election, the deposit of original poll with the secre-
tary of state, and a procedure in case the same person was elected in 
more than one district.  It further provided for the choice of presi-
dential electors, to be appointed by legislature on the first Wednesday 
of the following January, and required them to take an oath. 
D.  Summary of the Evidence on “Manner of Election” 
The foregoing sources—British, Scottish, Irish, and American—all 
used the phrase “manner of election” (or a close variant) and speci-
fied one or more components of that phrase.  The sources tend to 
supplement and reinforce rather than contradict each other.  Consi-
dered in the aggregate, they suggest that regulating the “manner of 
election” encompassed the following: 
 Fixing the qualifications of the electors and of candidates; 
 Setting the time of the election, including terms of office; 
 Fixing the place of election, including description of district bounda-
ries; 
 Determining whether election was to be a single-tier or double-tier 
process—i.e., whether voters decided the winner directly, or merely se-
lected a class of people who either selected the ultimate winner or 
from whom the ultimate winner was chosen by lot; 
 Setting the rules for both tiers of a double-tier process; 
 Determining whether the victor needed a majority or a plurality; 
 Regulating the mechanics of voting, including provisions for notice, 
returns, ballots or viva voce voting, and counting; 
 
STATE OF NEW YORK 395 (1789).  This law divided the state into six representative dis-
tricts, provided that each elector was entitled to vote for one person, provided for signing 
of poll lists, opening of election box, delivery to Sheriff, transmittal of box unopened to 
Secretary of State, canvassing procedure, election by plurality, certification, an oath for 
canvassers, dates of election, a vacancy procedure, penalties for bribery and corrupt con-
duct and for failure of administrator to perform his duty, no calling of militia during elec-
tion or with twenty days before, and no service of civil process on elector on election day 
or day preceding. 
 74 An Act for Prescribing on the Part of this State, the Times, Places, and Manner of holding 
Elections for Representatives in the Congress, and the Manner of appointing Electors of a 
President of the United States (Nov. 4, 1788), reprinted in PUBLIC LAWS OF SOUTH 
CAROLINA 462, 463–63 (1790). 
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 Erecting procedures to resolve election disputes; and 
 Regulating Election Day behavior—e.g., providing for freedom for civ-
il process and for punishment of Election Day misconduct. 
With this background, we proceed to examine the electoral provi-
sions the Framers actually drafted. 
III.  THE FRAMING AND LANGUAGE OF THE TIMES, PLACES AND MANNER 
CLAUSE 
A.  Drafting History 
Although the intent of the Constitution’s drafters—the Framers—
is not as authoritative as the original understanding and original pub-
lic meaning,75 their intent is useful evidence as to both since the Fra-
mers were part of the wider public and, in many cases, were influenti-
al ratifiers.  This section, therefore, reviews the drafting history of the 
Times, Places and Manner Clause. 
After the Constitutional Convention achieved a quorum on May 
25, 1787, it debated and adopted a series of resolutions designed to 
serve as the basis for the new Constitution.76  On July 26, the tired 
delegates adjourned for a ten-day recess, leaving behind them a 
“Committee of Detail” to convert the resolutions into a draft constitu-
tion.  The committee consisted of five members.  One was Nathaniel 
Gorham of Massachusetts, a merchant who had been president of 
Congress and was then chairman of the Convention’s Committee of 
the Whole.  The other four consisted of some of America’s most dis-
tinguished lawyers.  One was the committee chairman, John Rutledge 
of South Carolina, then serving as the state’s chancellor.  The re-
maining three were Edmund Randolph of Virginia, then his state’s 
governor and a former attorney general; James Wilson, one of Penn-
sylvania’s foremost legal practitioners; and Judge Oliver Ellsworth of 
Connecticut. 
If construed literally, one of the convention’s resolutions would 
have bestowed almost unlimited authority on the new government:  It 
granted to Congress, in addition to the powers the Confederation 
Congress had enjoyed, authority “to legislate in all Cases for the gen-
eral Interests of the Union, and also in those Cases to which the 
States are separately incompetent, or in which the Harmony of the 
 
 75 See supra Part I.C. 
 76 The convention resolutions for the Committee of Detail are collected at 2 FARRAND’S 
RECORDS, supra note 1, at 129–33. 
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United States may be interrupted.”77  However, that resolution had 
been adopted rather early in the process, and by the latter part of Ju-
ly, a growing number of delegates apparently were having second 
thoughts about giving the new Federal Congress so much power.78  
The Committee of Detail decided to follow the trend rather than the 
resolution, substituting a list of discrete enumerated federal powers.79  
On the list was an early version of the Times, Places and Manner 
Clause. 
The Committee of Detail’s “times, places and manner” clause 
granted to the “Legislature of the United States” authority to alter 
any state rules regulating the “Times and Places and Manner of hold-
ing the Elections of the Members of each House.”80  A few days later, 
James Madison and Gouverneur Morris moved to add a proviso ex-
empting from congressional control the places for electing Senators.81  
They believed that because Senators were to be elected by the state 
legislatures, it would not be proper for Congress to dictate where a 
state legislature was to convene.82  Although this proviso was voted 
down at the time, the Convention reversed itself the following 
month,83 and the final version of the Clause was fixed. 
The constitutional language governing congressional elections 
differed from usual eighteenth-century “manner of election” provi-
sions in two important respects.  First, the usual “manner of election” 
provision included elector and candidate qualifications, times of elec-
tion (including terms of office), places of election (including district 
boundaries), as well as other administrative details.84  The Constitu-
tion, on the other hand, listed qualifications, times, and places sepa-
 
 77 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 131; see also Natelson, Enumerated, supra note 1, at 
472. 
 78 Natelson, Enumerated, supra note 1, at 472–73. 
 79 Id. at 473. 
 80 The committee version read:  “The Times and Places and the Manner of holding the 
Elections of the Members of each House shall be prescribed by the Legislature of each 
State; but their Provisions concerning them may, at any Time, be altered (or superseded) 
by the Legislature of the United States.”  2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 165 (re-
porting records of the Committee of Detail).  The committee reported to the convention 
on August 6, 1787. 
 81 On August 9, James Madison and Morris moved to add a proviso exempting the places of 
electing Senators, which was voted down.  Id. at 240. 
 82 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 366 (reporting remarks of James Madison in the Vir-
ginia ratifying convention). 
 83 The latter vote was unanimous.  2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 613 (Sept. 14, 
1787). 
 84 See supra Part II. 
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rately from “Manner.”85  Second, after providing for qualifications, 
times, and places, the Constitution described the residuum as “the 
Manner of holding Elections.”  This precise phrase seems to have been 
newly coined86 to denote a subset of traditional “manner” regulation.  
Unlike the phrase “manner of elections,” it excluded qualifications, 
times, and places. 
In view of the legal qualifications, experience, and abilities of the 
men primarily responsible for this language, it is unlikely that the 
Constitution’s reference to “Manner of holding” rather than the tra-
ditional “manner of elections” was accidental or unconsidered.  In-
deed, the Constitution’s counterpart for presidential elections, set 
forth in Article II, confirms this. 
The Article II counterpart to “Manner of holding” was not the Ar-
ticle II phrase that actually employed the word “Manner”—“Each 
State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may di-
rect, a Number of [presidential] Electors.”87  That phrase referred to 
a manner of appointment rather than election, and permitted states to 
dispense with election of presidential electors entirely in favor of 
another mode of choice, such as designation by the governor.88  It was 
an acknowledgment of state power to fix the qualifications (or identi-
ty) of the person or persons appointing the presidential electors, and 
as such it served as the counterpart to the provision in Article I au-
thorizing the states to set the qualifications of persons choosing the 
House of Representatives.89 
 
 85 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (two-year terms for Representatives and qualifications of vot-
ers for Representatives), id. cl. 2 (qualifications of Representatives); id. art. I, § 3, cl. 1 
(terms of Senators; their electors to be state legislators), id. cl. 3 (qualifications of Sena-
tors); id. art. I, § 5, cl. 1 (“Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and 
Qualifications of its own members . . . .”). 
 86 A Jan. 28, 2010 search in the Gale Database, Eighteenth Century Collections Online, which 
covers nearly 200,000 works of the era (including most leading legal works), uncovered 
no instances of phrases with the words “manner,” “holding,” and “election(s)” within 
three words of each other before the publication of the Constitution in 1787.  A 1777 
New York election law had labeled its “manner” regulations as covering the “mode of 
holding elections,” and a 1787 New York law referred to the “mode of conducting” elec-
tions.  See supra notes 66 & 69 and accompanying text. 
 87 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (emphasis added). 
 88 Id.  But see Kesavan, supra note 29, at 1750 (arguing that “[t]here is little reason to sup-
pose that the word “Manner” in the Times, Places and Manner Clause has a substantially 
different meaning from the word “Manner” in Article II, Section 1, Clause 2”).  As ex-
plained in the text, however, the Article II use of “Manner” is broader than its use in the 
Times, Places and Manner Clause. 
 89 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (“[T]he Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications 
requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature.”). 
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Rather, the presidential counterpart to the Article I “Manner of 
holding” was the list of residual election regulations that makes up 
most of Article II, Section 1, Clause 3.90  Like Article I, Article II pro-
vided separately for times,91 places,92 candidate qualifications,93 and 
elector qualifications.94  The residuum (most of Article II, Section 1, 
Clause 3) consisted of whom electors could vote for; how many can-
didates each could vote for; creation of a voting list; signing, certify-
ing, and transmitting the list; the identity of the presiding election 
official; formalities of opening of the certified lists; the requirement 
that the victor obtain a majority; and procedures for selection if no 
candidate received a majority.95  As the counterpart to Article I’s 
“Manner of holding,” this list strongly suggests the sort of rules the 
Framers had in mind when they used that phrase in Article I.  Moreo-
 
 90 Article II, Section 1, Clause 3 provides: 
The Electors shall . . . vote by Ballot for two Persons, of whom one at least shall not 
be an Inhabitant of the same State with themselves.  And they shall make a List of 
all the Persons voted for, and of the Number of Votes for each; which List they 
shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the Seat of the Government of the 
United States, directed to the President of the Senate.  The President of the Se-
nate shall, in the Presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all 
the Certificates, and the Votes shall then be counted.  The Person having the 
greatest Number of Votes shall be the President, if such Number be a Majority of 
the whole Number of Electors appointed; and if there be more than one who have 
such Majority, and have an equal Number of Votes, then the House of Representa-
tives shall immediately chuse [sic] by Ballot one of them for President; and if no 
Person have a Majority, then from the five highest on the List the said House shall 
in like Manner chuse [sic] the President.  But in chusing [sic] the President, the 
Votes shall be taken by States, the Representation from each State having one 
Vote; A quorum for this Purpose shall consist of a Member or Members from two 
thirds of the States, and a Majority of all the States shall be necessary to a Choice.  
In every Case, after the Choice of the President, the Person having the greatest 
Number of Votes of the Electors shall be the Vice President.  But if there should 
remain two or more who have equal Votes, the Senate shall chuse from them by 
Ballot the Vice President. 
  Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 3. 
 91 Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 4 (“The Congress may determine the Time of chusing [sic] the Electors, 
and the Day on which they shall give their Votes; which Day shall be the same throughout 
the United States.”); id., art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (“He shall hold his Office during the Term of 
four Years.”). 
 92 Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 3 (“The Electors shall meet in their respective States.”). 
 93 Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 5 (“No person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United 
States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of 
President; neither shall any Person be eligible to that Office who shall not have attained 
to the Age of thirty five Years, and been fourteen Years a Resident within the United 
States.”). 
 94 Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (“Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof 
may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Repre-
sentatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress: but no Senator or Repre-
sentative, or Person holding an Office of Trust or Profit under the United States, shall be 
appointed an Elector.”). 
 95 Id. art. II, § 1, cl 3. 
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ver, when added to qualifications, times, and places, the list corres-
ponds closely to what other contemporary sources have to say about 
regulating the “manner of elections.”96 
B.  Significance of the Constitutional Plan:  The Original Public Meaning 
Part II described the understood scope of regulating the “manner 
of election” in Anglo-American legal practice.  That scope included 
the qualifications of electors and elected; terms of office and other 
issues of time; legislative districting and other issues of place; and 
rules of decision and other Election Day conduct.  “Manner of elec-
tion” also included procedure for both single-tier and double-tier 
elections. 
Part III.A showed how the Framers divided traditional “manner of 
election” rules into qualifications, times, places, and a residual phrase 
of narrower scope:  “Manner of holding Elections.”  The results may 
be represented in formulaic terms as follows: 
“Manner of election” = Qualifications + Times + Places + “Manner 
of holding.” 
Or, if one prefers: 
“Manner of holding” = “manner of election” – qualifications – 
times – places.97 
From the foregoing, we might describe the original public meaning 
of congressional power under the Times, Places and Manner Clause 
as follows: 
 Subject to some override (see below), the Clause left untouched the 
states’ reserved police power to regulate elections.  State laws were not 
necessarily limited to the understood scope of “manner of election” 
regulations.  States might adopt other kinds of laws, even if they af-
fected federal elections.  For example, a state might alter the composi-
tion of its legislature in a way that influenced the election of Sena-
tors.98 
 The Constitution withheld from both state and congressional control 
the qualifications and terms of office for Senators and Representatives. 
 
 96 Supra Part II. 
 97 The accuracy of this formula was confirmed in the ratification debates by Federalist 
spokesman Tench Coxe.  Infra note 153 and accompanying text; see also FOSTER’S 
MINUTES, supra note 1, at 44 (quoting Federalist Henry Marchant at the first sitting of the 
Rhode Island ratifying convention as correcting an Anti-Federalist by excluding qualifica-
tions of electors from the Times, Places and Manner Clause). 
 98 Cf. Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232, 257 (1921) (“Many things are prerequisites to 
elections or may affect their outcome—voters, education, means of transportation, 
health, public discussion, immigration, private animosities, even the face and figure of 
the candidate; but authority to regulate the manner of holding them gives no right to 
control any of these.”). 
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 The Constitution withheld from congressional control the qualifica-
tions of electors for Senators and Representatives and the places of 
choosing Senators. 
 Subject to the last two exceptions, the Clause granted Congress power 
to override state “manner” regulations. 
 Because congressional authority was limited by the terms of the grant, 
however, the Clause gave Congress no authority to regulate subjects 
outside of the understood scope of “manner of election” regulation. 
IV.  THE TIMES, PLACES AND MANNER CLAUSE IN THE RATIFICATION 
DEBATES 
A.  The Level of Controversy and the Sources 
During the ratification debates, the Times, Places and Manner 
Clause proved to be one of the most controversial provisions in the 
new Constitution.  At the Virginia ratifying convention, delegate 
George Nicholas fairly described the extent of the controversy when 
he said that objections against the Clause had “echoed from one end 
of the continent to the other.”99  Because the Times, Places and Man-
ner Clause was so controversial, the historical record contains a mas-
sive number of references to it.  For example, the transcript of the 
Massachusetts ratifying convention contains several days of debate on 
the subject.100 
This embarrassment of riches presents a dilemma.  In articles of 
this type, my practice has been to provide fairly exhaustive citation 
for every historical conclusion, so readers readily can check the 
sources for themselves.  In the case of the Times, Places and Manner 
Clause, exhaustive citation is not possible—footnotes would com-
pletely overwhelm the text.  Therefore, many of the footnotes below 
include illustrative citations only.  Readers can access further exam-
ples by checking the indices of standard sources.101 
B.  The Arguments in the Ratification Debates 
One of the political principles to which both Anti-Federalists and 
Federalists were committed was that of “sympathy” between govern-
 
 99 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 9 (reporting remarks by George Nicholas at the Vir-
ginia ratifying convention). 
100 Debate on this and related election provisions dominated the debate from January 11, 
1788 through January 17.  2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 5–39. 
101 See, e.g., ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1; DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1. 
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ment officials and governed.102  Today we might say “empathy” rather 
than “sympathy,” but the general idea was that there should an iden-
tity of interest and ideals between public officials and the people as a 
whole.103  Favorite devices for effectuating sympathy were large legisla-
tures with members elected from small districts and frequent—
usually annual—elections.104 
Anti-Federalists argued that the Constitution would not sufficient-
ly assure sympathy.  The Senate was to be small, indirectly elected, 
and installed for long terms.  The President was to be indirectly 
elected for a four year term, without the check of an elected execu-
tive council.  In such a government, the people’s primary hope would 
lie with the House of Representatives.105  But the House initially was to 
consist only of sixty-five members, and never more than one repre-
sentative for every thirty thousand people.  A body of such small size, 
the Anti-Federalists argued, easily could be “corrupted”—diverted 
from its duty to serve as the people’s guardians, servants, agents, and 
trustees.106 
Anti-Federalists did not claim that every session of Congress would 
be so corrupted.  But any congressional majority could employ the 
Times, Places and Manner Clause to overrule state election laws so as 
to ensure its own perpetuity and convert the government into a here-
 
102 See generally, Robert G. Natelson, A Reminder:  The Constitutional Values of Sympathy and In-
dependence, 91 KY. L.J. 353 (2002–03). 
103 Id. at 358. 
104 Id. at 367–72. 
105 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 55 (reporting remarks of Timothy (or James; which 
is not certain) Bloodworth in the North Carolina ratifying convention:  “The House of 
Representatives is the only democratical branch. This clause may destroy representation 
entirely”); Cato (N.Y. Gov. George Clinton), Letter VII, N.Y. J., Jan. 3, 1788, reprinted in 15 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 240, 241 (“[I]f they will have any security at all in 
this government, [they] will find it in the house of representatives.”). 
106 A COLUMBIAN PATRIOT (Mercy Otis Warren), OBSERVATIONS ON THE CONSTITUTION (Feb. 
1788), reprinted in 16 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 272, 281 (stating that 
“[o]ne Representative to thirty thousand inhabitants is a very inadequate representation; 
and every man who is not lost to all sense of freedom to his country, must reprobate the 
idea of Congress altering by law, or on any pretence [sic] whatever, interfering with any 
regulations for the time, places, and manner of choosing our own Representatives”); see 
also 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 326 (reporting Governor Clinton, an Anti-
Federalist, defending the proposed federal Senate:  “It was true, he said, the representa-
tives of the people, and the senators, might deviate from their duty, and express a will dis-
tinct from that of the people, or that of the legislatures; but any body might see that this 
must arise from corruption”); cf.  2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 32 (reporting re-
marks by William Widgery at the Massachusetts ratifying convention on the small size of 
the representation). 
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ditary aristocracy.107  This was exactly why, they asserted, Baron Mon-
tesquieu viewed a republic’s election laws as “fundamental.”108 
In what ways could Congress manipulate the election laws to as-
sure its own perpetuity?  Some of the Anti-Federalist answers were not 
tenable from a fair reading of the constitutional text.  Among these 
was the claim that the Times, Places and Manner Clause would ena-
ble Congress to extend its own terms indefinitely,109 just as Parliament 
previously had extended the terms of the House of Commons from 
 
107 The alleged aristocratic tendencies of the Times, Places and Manner Clause—and, in-
deed, of the entire Constitution—were a common Anti-Federalist theme.  E.g., Cincinna-
tus, Letter VI:  To James Wilson, Esquire, N.Y. J., Dec. 6, 1787, reprinted in 14 DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY, supra note 1, at 360, 363; cf. Centinel, Letter VIII, PHILA. INDEP. GAZETTEER, Jan. 
2, 1788, reprinted in 15 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 231, 232 (“[T]hat which 
gives Congress the absolute controul [sic] over the time and mode of its appointment 
and election, whereby, independent of any other means, they may establish hereditary 
despotism . . . .”).  For more information, see the Anti-Federalist satire written by “Aristo-
crotis,” who discussed how the Times, Places and Manner Clause could be used to create 
a hereditary aristocracy.  ARISTOCROTIS (William Petrikin), THE GOVERNMENT OF NATURE 
DELINEATED; OR AN EXACT PICTURE OF THE NEW FEDERAL CONSTITUTION (1788), cited in 
17 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 229, reprinted in 2 MFM. SUPP. Pa. 661. 
108 THE ADDRESS AND REASONS OF DISSENT OF THE MINORITY OF THE CONVENTION OF 
PENNSYLVANIA TO THEIR CONSTITUENTS (1787), reprinted in 15 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, 
supra note 1, at 13, 24 (quoting Montesquieu); Federal Farmer, Letter XII, Jan. 12, 1788, 
reprinted in 17 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 310 (“It is well observed by Mon-
tesquieu, that in republican governments, the forms of elections are fundamental; and 
that it is an essential part of the social compact, to ascertain by whom, to whom, when, 
and in what manner suffrages are to be given.  Wherever we find the regulation of elec-
tions have not been carefully fixed by the constitution, or the principles of them, we con-
stantly see the legislatures new modifying its own form, and changing the spirit of the 
government to answer partial purposes.”); see also Address of the Minority of the Md. Conven-
tion, ANNAPOLIS GAZETTE, May 1, 1788, reprinted in 15 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 
1, at 242, 246 (“The second objection respecting the power of congress to alter elections, 
they thought indispensable.  Montesquieu says, that the rights of election should be estab-
lished unalterably by fundamental laws in a free government.”). 
109 Agrippa, Letter I, MASS. GAZETTE, Nov. 23, 1787, reprinted in 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, 
supra note 1, at 303, 305 (“Should the people cry aloud the representative may avail him-
self of the right to alter the time of election and postpone it for another year.”); Centinel V, 
PHILA. INDEP. GAZETTEER, Dec. 4, 1787, reprinted in 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 
1, at 343, 347; Samuel, INDEP. CHRON., Jan. 10, 1788, reprinted in 5 DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY, supra note 1, at 678, 680 (“And there is nothing to hinder, but ample provision 
made, for Congress to make themselves perpetual.  For by Art. I, Sect. 4 the Congress may 
at any time, make and alter the time, place and manner of choosing Representatives; and 
the time and manner of choosing Senators.”); see also 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 
52 (reporting remarks by Samuel Spencer at the North Carolina ratifying convention); 
THE ADDRESS AND REASONS OF DISSENT OF THE MINORITY OF THE CONVENTION OF 
PENNSYLVANIA TO THEIR CONSTITUENTS, supra note 108, at 23; 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, 
supra note 1, at 426 (reporting remarks by Robert Whitehill at the Pennsylvania ratifying 
convention). 
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three to seven years.110  Anti-Federalists argued that Congress could 
impose additional qualifications on voters and candidates for office,111 
rip the choice of Senators away from the state legislatures,112 and 
eventually annihilate the states.113  When the Federalists pointed out 
that such apprehensions were contradicted by the text,114 some Anti-
 
110 Anti-Federalists frequently cited this precedent. See, e.g., 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1, 
at 61–62 (reporting remarks by David Caldwell at the North Carolina ratifying conven-
tion); Agrippa, Letter XIII, supra note 35, at 770; Centinel III, PHILA. INDEP. GAZETTEER, 
Nov. 8, 1787, reprinted in 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 55, 60. 
111 Cornelius, HAMPSHIRE CHRON., Dec. 18, 1787, reprinted in 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra 
note 1, at 410, 413 (“By this Federal Constitution, each House is to be the judge, not only 
of the elections, and returns, but also of the qualifications of its members; and that, with-
out any other rule than such as they themselves may prescribe.”).  For another entrant in 
this Anti-Federalist parade of horribles, see Agrippa, Letter XIII, supra note 35, at 770 (By 
altering the time they may continue a representative during his whole life; by altering the 
manner, they may fill up the vacancies by their own votes without the consent of the 
people; and by altering the place, all the elections may be made at the seat of the federal 
government).  See also 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 175–76 (reporting remarks of 
Patrick Henry at the Virginia ratifying convention on voter qualifications, citing 
precedent of ancient Rome). 
112 Letter from Samuel Osgood, to Samuel Adams (Jan. 5, 1787), reprinted in 15 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 263, 265 (“How far the Word ‘Manner’ extends I 
know not—But I suppose, if Congress should determine, that the People at large, or a 
certain Description of them, should vote on the Senators, it would only be altering the 
Manner of choosing them—If this be true, Congress will have the exclusive Right of 
pointing out the Qualification of the Voters for Senators . . . .”). 
113 Luther Martin, Genuine Information IV, BALT. MD. GAZETTE, Jan. 8, 1788, reprinted in 15 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 296, 299 (claiming that the Times, Places and 
Manner Clause was designed to annihilate the state governments); 2 DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY, supra note 1, at 397–98 (reporting remarks by Robert Whitehill at the Pennsyl-
vania ratifying convention). 
114 E.g., 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 202–03 (reporting remarks of Edmund Ran-
dolph at the Virginia ratifying convention); 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 53 (re-
porting remarks of James Iredell at the North Carolina ratifying convention); id. at 60–61 
(reporting remarks by William Davie at the North Carolina ratifying convention); id. at 63 
(reporting remarks by [probably William rather than Archibald] MacLaine at the same 
convention); A Citizen of New Haven (Roger Sherman), Observations on the New Federal 
Constitution, CONN. COURANT, Jan. 7, 1788, reprinted in 15 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra 
note 1, at 280, 282 (“[T]he qualifications of the electors [for House of Representatives] 
are to remain as fixed by the constitutions and laws of the several states.”); THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 60 (Alexander Hamilton), reprinted in 16 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra 
note 1, at 195, 199; A Freeman (Tench Coxe), Letter II, PA. GAZETTE, Jan. 30, 1788, re-
printed in 15 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 508, 509 (“The elections of the Pres-
ident, Vice President, Senators and Representatives, are exclusively in the hands of the 
states, even as to filling vacancies.  The smallest interference of Congress is not permitted, 
either in prescribing the qualifications of electors, or in determining what persons may or 
may not be elected.  The clause which enables the foederal [sic] legislature to make regu-
lations on this head, permits them only to say at what time in the two years the house of 
representatives shall be chosen, at what time in the six years the Senate shall be chosen, 
and at what time in the four years the President shall be elected; but these elections, by 
other provisions in the constitution, must take place every two, four and six years . . . .”). 
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Federalists responded that the Times, Places and Manner Clause 
trumped the Constitution’s language governing qualifications and 
terms because that Clause appeared later in the instrument.115  To be 
sure, this reading contradicted the rules of construction in force dur-
ing the Founding Era.116  But, as one North Carolina Anti-Federalist 
suggested, “sophistry would enable them to reconcile them.”117  As far-
fetched as these Anti-Federalist claims may have been, they were 
grounded in the public meaning of what it was to regulate the “man-
ner of election.”118  One problem, however, is that they were not en-
compassed by the phrase the Constitution actually used:  “Manner of 
holding Elections.”119 
Other Anti-Federalist concerns were more consistent with the text.  
Some of the Constitution’s opponents observed that the Clause was 
not particularly well-drafted, leaving it open to misconstruction.120  
Federalists do not seem to have addressed that concern.  Other Anti-
Federalists expressed apprehension that Congress might fix the date 
and place of election to benefit the powerful and employ plurality-
winner rules and viva voce voting to assure the election of favored 
candidates.121 
These latter concerns were realistic in a world in which electors 
convened in open meetings in central locations to vote and in which 
 
115 E.g., Consider Arms, Malachi Maynard & Samuel Field, Dissent to the Massachusetts Conven-
tion, NORTHAMPTON HAMPSHIRE GAZETTE, April 9 & 16, 1788, reprinted in 17 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 42, 44 (“[Y]et all this is wholly superseded by a 
subsequent provision, which empowers Congress at any time to enact a law, whereby such 
regulations may be altered, except as to the places of chusing [sic] senators.”). 
116 One example of such a rule is the rule of construction against surplus.  See TIMOTHY 
BRANCH, PRINCIPIA LEGIS ET AEQUITATIS 134 (London 1753) (Sic interpretandum est ut Verba 
accipiantur cum effectu—that is, “One should interpret so that words are received with an 
effect” (translation by the author)); see also id. at 117 (Verba aliquid operari debent,—debent 
intelligi ut aliquid operentur—“Words should have some effect; they should be understood 
to have an effect (translation by the author)).  Thus, Federalist Robert Steele could ask 
the North Carolina ratifying convention:  “Is it not a maxim of universal jurisprudence, of 
reason and common sense, that an instrument or deed of writing shall be so construed as 
to give validity to all parts of it, if it can be done without involving any absurdity?” 4 
ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 71. 
117 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 106 (reporting remarks of William Taylor at the 
North Carolina ratifying convention). 
118 See supra Part II. 
119 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. 
120 E.g., 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note1, at 54–55 (reporting remarks of Samuel Spencer at 
the North Carolina ratifying convention); A FEDERAL REPUBLICAN, A REVIEW OF THE 
CONSTITUTION (1787), reprinted in 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 255, 262–
63 (attacking the ambiguity of the Clause, and stating that it cannot be merely to provide 
regulations if a state refuses to do so, because if the state does not hold an election, there 
can be nothing to regulate). 
121 Infra notes 123–27and accompanying text. 
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people living in remote areas might spend several days traveling to 
the designated location.  If Congress were to decree that elections 
were to be held in the middle of winter or during harvest time, many 
voters would be effectively disenfranchised.122  Moreover, there was no 
requirement that Representatives be elected in districts.  Congress 
could decide that a state’s entire delegation would be selected at 
large123 and designate a single location for voting in each state.124  A 
Congress dominated by the merchant class might select a seacoast lo-
cation in each state (for example, Boston or New York City), thereby 
making it easy for merchants and their allies to vote and very difficult 
 
122 Cato (N.Y. Gov. George Clinton), Letter VII, N.Y. J., Jan. 3, 1788, reprinted in 15 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 240, 241 (“Congress may establish a place, or 
places, at either the extremes, center, or outer parts of the states; at a time and season too, 
when it may be very inconvenient to attend; and by these means destroy the rights of election” 
(emphasis added)). 
123 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 327 (reporting remarks of Melancthon Smith at the 
New York ratifying convention); Federal Farmer, Letter III, Oct. 10, 1787, reprinted in 14 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 30, 31. 
124 Cato (N.Y. Gov. George Clinton), Letter VII, N.Y. J., Jan. 3, 1788, reprinted in 15 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 105, at 240, 241–42 (“It is a good rule, in the con-
struction of a contract, to suppose, that what may be done will be; therefore, in consider-
ing this subject, you are to suppose, that in the exercise of this government, a regulation 
of congress will be made, for holding an election for the whole state at Poughkeepsie, at 
New-York [sic], or, perhaps, at Fort-Stanwix [sic]: who will then be the actual electors for 
the house of representatives?”); see also Cumberland County Petition to the Pennsylvania 
Convention, Dec. 5, 1787, reprinted in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 309, 311 
(“Here appears to be scarcely the shadow of representation provided, because the Con-
gress may at their pleasure, order the election for the Representatives of the State of 
Pennsylvania, to be held in Philadelphia, where it will be impossible for the people of the 
state to assemble for the purpose; and thus the citizens of Philadelphia would be 
represented, and scarcely any part else of the commonwealth. The MANNER and TIME 
may prevent three-fourths of the present electors of the state, from giving a vote as long 
as they live.”).   
   As “Cato’s” comment about Fort Stanwix illustrates, some Anti-Federalists suggested 
that elections might be held only in remote, inconvenient areas.  E.g., Anonymous, Bless-
ings of the New Government, PHILA. INDEP. GAZETTEER, Oct 6, 1787, reprinted in 13 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 345–46 (satirically claiming, “Among the blessings 
of the new-proposed government our correspondent enumerates the following. . . .  Elec-
tions for Pennsylvania held at Pittsburg, or perhaps Wyoming [Pennsylvania]”); see also 2 
ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 30 (reporting remarks by Charles Turner at the Massa-
chusetts ratifying convention as saying the elections might be held at the “extremity of a 
state”); 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 55 (reporting remarks of Timothy (or James; 
which is not certain) Bloodworth in the North Carolina ratifying convention:  expressing 
similar sentiments); Letter from Richard Henry Lee, to James Gordon, Jr. (Feb. 26, 
1788), reprinted in 16 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 210, 212 (suggesting that 
Virginia’s elections might be held at Cape Henry).   
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for back-country farmers to do so.125  Anti-Federalists alleged that this 
already had proved a problem in some states.126 
The Anti-Federalist essayist calling himself “The Federal Farmer” 
emphasized the danger from a plurality-victor rule.  In a scattered 
field of candidates, a relatively low percentage of the vote might 
amount to a plurality.  A small but organized commercial or “aristo-
cratic” faction could easily elect an unpopular candidate in a crowded 
field, particularly if the polls were located in a city dominated by that 
faction.127  To show that this was not a chimerical fear, the Federal 
Farmer cited precedents.128  Other Anti-Federalists pointed to Con-
gress’s power to mandate viva voce voting, thereby better enabling 
dominant factions to control election results.129 
“Brutus,” one of the best of the Anti-Federalist writers and a com-
mon foil for the “Publius” of the Federalist Papers,130 summarized 
these concerns: 
 
125 See, e.g., Vox Populi, MASS. GAZETTE, Oct. 30, 1787, reprinted in 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, 
supra note 1, at 168, 170 (“Supposing Congress should direct, that the representatives of 
this commonwealth should be chosen all in one town, (Boston, for instance) on the first 
day of March—would not that be a very injurious institution to the good people of this 
commonwealth?—Would not there be at least nine-tenths of the landed interest of this 
commonwealth entirely unrepresented? . . . . What, then, would be the case if Congress 
should think proper to direct, that the elections should be held at the north-west, south-
west, or north-east part of the state, the last day of March?  How many electors would at-
tend the business?”); see Cornelius, HAMPSHIRE CHRON., Dec. 18, 1787, reprinted in 4 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 410, 413–14 (discussing the risk that mercantile 
interests will dominate elections located in seaport towns); see also 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, 
supra note 1, at 60 (reporting remarks by Patrick Henry at the Virginia ratifying conven-
tion expressing similar fears); AMERICAN HERALD, Jan. 14, 1788, reprinted in 5 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 709, 711 (expressing similar fears); Cato (N.Y. 
Gov. George Clinton), supra note 105, at 242 (“And would not the government by this 
means have it in their power to put whom they pleased in the house of representatives?”). 
126 Centinel I, PHILA. INDEP. GAZETTEER, Oct. 5, 1787, reprinted in 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, 
supra note 1, at 326, 334 (“[T]he inhabitants in a number of larger states, who are remote 
from the seat of government, are loudly complaining of the inconveniencies and disad-
vantages they are subjected to on this account, and that, to enjoy the comforts of local 
government, they are separating into smaller divisions.”). 
127 Federal Farmer, supra note 123, at 31.  Lee argued that the Constitution should have re-
quired single-member districts and that Representatives reside in their districts.  Id. at 32.  
His most complete treatment is in Federal Farmer, supra note 108, at 311–15. 
128 Federal Farmer, supra note 108, at 314 (referring to British and American precedents). 
129 Centinel III, supra note 110, at 59 (stating that Congress could abolish the secret ballot); 
see also Letter from William Symmes, Jr., to Peter Osgood, Jr. (Nov. 15, 1787), reprinted in 
14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 107, 110 (stating that instead of allowing 
Congress to prescribe the manner of holding elections, the Constitution should have spe-
cified the manner, such as the secret ballot). 
130 “Brutus” may have been Judge Robert Yates, who had served as a federal convention del-
egate from New York, but left the convention early in dissatisfaction. 
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It is clear that, under [the Times, Places and Manner Clause] the foeder-
al [sic] legislature may institute such rules respecting elections as to lead 
to the choice of one description of men.  The weakness of the represen-
tation [i.e., small size of the House], tends but too certainly to confer on 
the rich and well-born, all honours; but the power granted in this [sec-
tion], may be so exercised, as to secure it almost beyond a possibility of 
controul [sic].  The proposed Congress may make the whole state one 
district, and direct, that the capital . . . shall be the place for holding the 
election; the consequence would be, that none but men of the most ele-
vated rank in society would attend . . . They may declare that those mem-
bers who have the greatest number of votes, shall be considered as duly 
elected; the consequence would be that the people, who are dispersed in 
the interior parts of the state, would give their votes for a variety of can-
didates, while any order or profession, residing in populous places, by 
uniting their interests, might procure whom they pleased to be chosen—
and by this means the representatives of the state may be elected by one 
tenth part of the people who actually vote.131 
Accordingly, Anti-Federalists urged that the Constitution either be re-
jected, accepted after removal of the Times, Places and Manner 
Clause, or amended to weaken congressional control over elections.132  
If the final say over federal elections had to be lodged somewhere, 
 
131 Brutus, Letter IV, N.Y. J., Nov. 29, 1787, reprinted in 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 
1, at 297, 301–02; see also 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 11 (reporting remarks by 
remarks of Ebenezer Peirce [sic] at the Massachusetts ratifying convention). 
132 E.g., Agrippa, Letter XVI, MASS. GAZETTE, Feb. 5, 1788, reprinted in 5 DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY, supra note 1, at 863, 865 (proposing that “the [C]onstitution . . . be received on-
ly upon” condition that it be amended to limit congressional power to “fining such state 
as shall neglect to send its representatives or senators, a sum not exceeding the expense 
of supporting its representatives or senators one year”); Federal Farmer, supra note 108, 
at 318 (“[A]t most, congress ought to have power to regulate elections only where a state 
shall neglect to make them.”); Robert Whitehall, Reporting Remarks, reprinted in 2 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 598 (observing “that the several states shall have 
power to regulate the elections for Senators and Representatives, without being con-
trolled either directly or indirectly by any interference on the part of Congress”).  George 
Mason suggested as part of a proposed bill of rights that 
Congress shall not exercise the [Times, Places and Manner Clause], but in Cases 
when a State neglects or refuses to make the Regulations therein mentioned, or 
shall make Regulations subversive of the Rights of the People to a free and equal 
Representation in Congress agreeably to the Constitution, or shall be prevented 
from making Elections by Invasion or Rebellion; and in any of these Cases, such 
Powers shall be exercised by the Congress only until the Cause be removed. 
  Letter from George Mason to John Lamb (June 9, 1788) (enclosure), reprinted in 18 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 40, 44.  A caucus of Pennsylvania citizens pro-
posed another amendment to similar effect.  Proceedings of the Meeting at Harrisburg, 
Sept. 3, 1788, reprinted in 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 542 (“That Congress shall 
not have power to make or alter regulations concerning the time, place, and manner of 
electing senators and representatives, except in case of neglect or refusal by the state to 
make regulations for the purpose; and then only for such time as such neglect or refusal 
shall continue.”); see also 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 325–26 (reporting remarks 
of Samuel Jones at the New York ratifying convention). 
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they said, lodging it in the state legislatures was a less risky alternative 
than placing it in Congress.  State legislatures were more numerous 
bodies, usually elected annually, and thus more likely to be in sympa-
thy with the interests of the people.133  In addition, state lawmakers 
were familiar with local conditions.134 
Anti-Federalist arguments about the Times, Places and Manner 
Clause resonated even with some of those otherwise committed to the 
Constitution; indeed, a number of important Federalists acknowl-
edged the force of those arguments.  Noah Webster (the future lex-
icographer) wrote an influential pamphlet135 praising every aspect of 
the Constitution, but criticizing the Times, Places and Manner Clause 
as unclear and potentially dangerous.136  He argued that the Clause 
could be read as giving a power to Congress to make regulations 
 “prescribed ‘in each State by the Legislature thereof,’”137 a phrase he 
said made no sense.  He added that to the extent the Clause gave 
Congress power to “alter” regulations already prescribed, it “put[] the 
election of representatives wholly, and the senators almost wholly, in 
the power of Congress.”138  “I see no occasion,” he wrote, “for any 
power in Congress to interfere with the choice of their own 
body . . . . [T]he clause . . . gives needless and dangerous powers . . . .”139  
 
133 Republican Federalist, Essay VI, MASS. CENTINEL, Feb. 2, 1788, reprinted in 5 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 843, 847; see also Brutus, supra note 131, at 302; 
Federal Farmer, supra note 108, at 317. 
134 Agrippa, supra note 132, at 864 (“As in every extensive empire, local laws are necessary to 
suit the different interests, no single legislature is adequate to the business.  All human 
capacities are limitted [sic] to a narrow space; and as no individual is capable of practis-
ing [sic] a great variety of trades no single legislature is capable of managing all the varie-
ty of national and state concerns.  Even if a legislature was capable of it, the business of 
the judicial department must, from the same cause, be slovenly done.  Hence arises the 
necessity of a division of the business into national and local.”); see also Letter from Wil-
liam Symmes, Jr., to Peter Osgood, Jr., supra note 129, at 107–16 (stating that he did not 
think Congress would have the wisdom to make regulations within the states); Vox Populi, 
supra note 125, at 170 (“And it is a little remarkable, that any gentleman should suppose, 
that Congress could possibly be in any measure as good judges of the time, place and 
manner of elections as the legislatures of the several respective states.”). 
135 Letter from James McClurg to James Madison (Oct. 31, 1787), reprinted in 13 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 406 (implying the importance of the pamphlet). 
136 A Citizen of America (Noah Webster), An Examination into the Leading Principles of the Fed-
eral Constitution (1787), reprinted in FRIENDS OF THE CONSTITUTION:  WRITINGS OF THE 
“OTHER” FEDERALISTS 1787–1788, at 373 (Colleen A. Sheehan & Gary L. McDowell eds., 
1998). 
137 Id. at 387.  At least one Anti-Federalist repeated Webster’s points about the vagueness of 
the Clause.  Expositor, Essay II, N.Y. J., Apr. 28, 1788, reprinted in 20 DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY, supra note 1, at 823, 828–29. 
138 A Citizen of America, supra note 136, at 387 (emphasis in original). 
139 Id. 
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Webster urged that the ratifying conventions accept the rest of the 
Constitution but reject that provision.140 
Webster was then a young political newcomer, but some seasoned 
Federalists shared his doubts as well—among them, James McClurg, 
who had served as a delegate to the federal convention.141  Some Fe-
deralists suggested that the Clause be amended to scale back congres-
sional control over federal elections.142 
 
140 Id. 
141 Letter from James McClurg to James Madison, supra note 135, at 406.  Another Federalist 
skeptic was David Ramsey, a former president of Congress and leading supporter of the 
Constitution in South Carolina.  Letter from David Ramsey to Benjamin Rush (Nov. 10, 
1787), reprinted in 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 83, 84; see also FOSTER’S 
MINUTES, supra note 1, at 44 (quoting Federalist Benjamin Bourn at the first sitting of the 
Rhode Island ratifying convention as conceding, “this is the most except[ion]al part of 
the Constitution” [meaning the most exceptionable part]); Letter from George Cabot, to 
Theophilus Parsons (Feb. 28, 1788), reprinted in 16 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, 
at 248, 249 (suggesting that some uniform rules could have been put in the Constitution 
rather than relying wholly on the discretion of Congress and the states); Letter from John 
Brown Cutting, to William Short (Dec. 13, 1787), reprinted in 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, 
supra note 1, at 475, 479 (without mentioning Webster, echoing that writer’s views about 
the Times, Places and Manner Clause); Letter from Walter Minto, to the Earl of Buchan 
(Oct. 28, 1787), reprinted in 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 505 (complaining 
of the same lack of clarity Webster cited; generally supporting the Constitution, but stat-
ing of the Times, Places and Manner Clause, that “[t]here are three or four things in it 
that I do not like.  Of these there is one which must be thrown out”); Letter from George 
Lee Turberville, to James Madison (Apr. 16, 1788), reprinted in 11 THE PAPERS OF JAMES 
MADISON 23, 24 (Robert A. Rutland & Charles F. Hobson eds., 1977) (lavishly praising 
Constitution in general, but decrying the lack of clarity of Times, Places and Manner 
Clause); see also Many Customers, INDEP. GAZETTEER, Dec. 1, 1787, reprinted in 2 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 306, 307–08 (acknowledging that the Constitu-
tion has many virtues but proposing omitting the Times, Places and Manner Clause).  
The young John Quincy Adams also was doubtful.  Letter from John Quincy Adams to 
William Cranch (Oct. 14, 1787), reprinted in 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 
222 (“Why must congress have the power of regulating the times, places, and manner of 
holding elections; or in other words, of prescribing the manner of their own appoint-
ments. This power is insidious, because it appears trivial, and yet will admit of such con-
struction, as will render it a very dangerous instrument in the hands of such a powerful 
body of men.”).  His correspondent favored a power to regulate time in the interest of 
uniformity, but saw no reason for place and manner powers.  Letter from William 
Cranch, to John Quincy Adams (Nov. 26, 1787), reprinted in 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, 
supra note 1, at 224, 225. 
142 E.g., Hampden, MASS. CENTINEL, Jan. 26, 1788, reprinted in 5 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, su-
pra note 1, at 806, 808 (proposing adopting the Constitution with an amendment striking 
the Clause and inserting:  “But if any State shall refuse to prescribe time and place for 
such elections, Congress shall provide therefor [sic] by laws made for that purpose”).  
The author added the following “Remark”:  “this amendment takes off the main objec-
tion made to this article, and gives Congress power to perpetuate its own existence.” Id; 
see also Letter from David Ramsey to Benjamin Rush (Nov. 10, 1787), supra note 141, at 84 
(favoring amendment to make the Times, Places and Manner Clause applicable only if 
states failed to make regulations). 
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Those defenders of the Constitution who did not share Anti-
Federalist doubts argued that the inherent legislative responsibility to 
“Judge of the Elections, Returns, and Qualifications of its own Mem-
bers”143 included  authority to ensure that elections were conducted 
fairly.144  They added that the Clause would enable Congress to fix na-
tionally-uniform election days,145 thereby forestalling opportunities 
for intrigue by factions and the well-connected.146  At least some Anti-
Federalists agreed with the latter idea,147 but pointed out that the 
scope of the Clause far exceeded the power to fix such a day.148  If the 
latter were the Framers’ goal, then why had they not merely fixed a 
day in the Constitution,149 or at least granted Congress power to do so 
using language similar to that in the Time Clause of Article II?150 
 
143 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1 (“Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns, 
and Qualifications of its own Members.”). 
144 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 537 (reporting remarks by Thomas McKean at the 
Pennsylvania ratifying convention); see also id. at 510 (reporting remarks by James Wilson 
at the Pennsylvania ratifying convention). 
145 E.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 61 (Alexander Hamilton), reprinted in 16 DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY, supra note 1, at 214, 216; 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 413 (report-
ing remarks by Thomas McKean at the Pennsylvania ratifying convention). 
146 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 10–11 (reporting remarks by George Nicholas at the 
Virginia ratifying convention); id. at 367 (reporting remarks by James Madison in the Vir-
ginia ratifying convention); 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 105 (reporting remarks 
by James Iredell at the North Carolina ratifying convention); 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, 
supra note 1, at 413 (reporting remarks by Thomas McKean at the Pennsylvania ratifying 
convention). 
147 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 510 (quoting the notes of William Findley, an 
Anti-Federalist leader at the Pennsylvania ratifying convention). 
148 Letter from William Cranch to John Quincy Adams (Nov. 26, 1787), supra note 141, at 
225 (favoring a power to regulate time in the interest of uniformity, but opposing place 
and manner powers). 
149 Anonymous, Strictures on the Proposed Constitution, PHILA. FREEMAN’S J., Sep. 26, 1787, re-
printed in 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 243, 245 (“The time, then, might as 
well have been fixed in Convention—not subject to alteration afterwards.” (emphasis in 
original)).  Hamilton responded that this “was a matter which might safely be entrusted 
to legislative discretion; and that if a time had been appointed, it might upon experiment 
have been found less convenient than some other time.”  THE FEDERALIST NO. 61 (Alex-
ander Hamilton), supra note 145, at 216; see also 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 367, 
408 (reporting remarks of James Madison in the Virginia ratifying convention, expressing 
similar sentiments).  Edmund Randolph’s initial outline of a constitution for the Com-
mittee of Detail (before emendations by John Rutledge) had mandated a uniform day:  
“The elections shall be biennially held on the same day through the state(s):  except in case 
of accidents, and where an adjournment to the succeeding day may be necessary.” 2 
FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 139 (reproducing records of the Committee of De-
tail). 
150 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 4 (“The Congress may determine the Time of chusing [sic] the 
Electors, and the Day of which they shall give their Votes; which Day shall be the same 
throughout the United States.”). 
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Federalists responded in a number of ways.  First, they emphasized 
the purely residual nature of the power to regulate the “Manner of 
holding” congressional elections.  As Tench Coxe, perhaps the most 
influential Federalist essayist at the time,151 remarked: 
Congress therefore were [sic] vested also with the power . . . of prescrib-
ing merely the circumstances under which the elections shall be holden 
[sic], not the qualifications of the electors, nor those of the elected—nor 
the duration of the senate—nor the duration of the representatives.  
These are prescribed by the constitution, unalterably by Congress.”152 
To Anti-Federalist suggestions that Congress might abuse its authori-
ty, the friends of the Constitution responded with scenarios of their 
own.  The state legislatures might run amok if left in unchecked con-
trol of federal elections.153  They might require electors to assemble in 
a remote location.154  They might draw congressional districts in gross-
ly unfair ways.155  They might mandate viva voce voting.156  They might 
rig the election rules so that state legislatures controlled the House of 
Representatives as well as the Senate.157 
Federalists supplemented their case by adding that congressional 
abuse of the Times, Places and Manner Clause was unlikely because 
of a lack of motive,158 because the diverse interests of states and “fac-
 
151 JACOB E. COOKE, TENCH COXE AND THE EARLY REPUBLIC 111 (1978). 
152 A Pennsylvanian to the New York Convention, PA. GAZETTE, Jun. 11, 1788, reprinted in 20 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 1139, 1145 (italics in original). 
153 E.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 61 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 145, at 214–15; Rufus 
King and Nathaniel Gorham, Response to Elbridge Gerry’s Objections (Nov. 3, 1787), reprinted 
in FARRAND, SUPPLEMENT, supra note 1, at 280, 281–82; see also 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra 
note 1, at 27 (reporting remarks by Theophilus Parsons at the Massachusetts ratifying 
convention). 
154 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 441 (reporting remarks by James Wilson at the Penn-
sylvania ratifying convention); id. at 303 (reporting remarks by Charles Coatsworth 
Pinckney during the South Carolina legislative debates preparatory to calling a state rati-
fying convention); FOSTER’S MINUTES, supra note 1, at 45 (quoting Federalist William Bar-
ton at the first sitting of the Rhode Island ratifying convention as defending the Clause as 
a way for Congress to prevent states from fixing an inconvenient voting place). 
155 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 50–51 (reporting remarks by Rufus King at the Mas-
sachusetts ratifying convention); 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 367 (reporting re-
marks of James Madison in the Virginia ratifying convention). 
156 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 413 (reporting remarks by Thomas McKean at 
the Pennsylvania ratifying convention). 
157 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 441 (reporting remarks by James Wilson at the Penn-
sylvania ratifying convention); id. at 26 (reporting remarks by Theophilus Parsons at the 
Massachusetts ratifying convention).  This concern also had been expressed at the federal 
convention. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 240–41 (recording comments by 
James Madison and Gouverneur Morris). 
158 A Citizen of New Haven (Roger Sherman), supra note 114, at 282 (“[W]hat motive can 
either [the state legislatures or Congress] have to injure the people in the exercise of that 
right?”); Letter from Roger Sherman to Unknown Addressee (Dec. 8, 1787), reprinted in 
14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 386, 388; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 60 (Al-
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tions” would prevent it from happening,159 because such a move 
would ignite popular outrage,160 and because the Senate would 
represent the interests of the state legislatures.161  They also noted 
that Congress’s power over “manner” would be no greater than that 
exercised by the states.162 
None of these was the proponents’ decisive argument, however.  
Their decisive argument was one that had first been raised at the fed-
eral convention:163 that the Times, Places and Manner Clause was 
needed to enable Congress to preserve its own existence.  In absence 
of a congressional power to regulate congressional elections, a group 
of states could destroy the House of Representatives by refusing to 
provide for those elections or by creating regulations designed to sa-
botage them.  As a precedent, the Federalists alleged that Rhode Isl-
and had damaged the operations of the Confederation Congress by 
refusing to send delegates to that body.164  The Federalists made this 
argument over and over, using it to sway votes in crucial states.165 
 
exander Hamilton), supra note 114, at 196.  Hamilton and others suggested that a ruth-
less Congress with an army behind it would not seize power by the indirect method of 
rigging the election laws.  Id. at 199; see also 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 10 (re-
porting remarks of George Nicholas at the Virginia ratifying convention). 
159 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 303 (reporting remarks by Charles Coatsworth 
Pinckney during the South Carolina legislative debates preparatory to calling a state rati-
fying convention as stating, “it cannot be supposed that any state wilt consent to fix the 
election at inconvenient seasons and places in any other state, lest she herself should he-
reafter experience the same inconvenience”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 60 (Alexander Hamil-
ton), supra note 114, at 196; cf. 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 510 (reporting re-
marks by James Wilson at the Pennsylvania ratifying convention as stating, “the general 
government will be more studious of the good of the whole than a particular state will 
be”). 
160 E.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 60 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 114, at 196; cf. 3 ELLIOT’S 
DEBATES, supra note 1, at 408 (reporting remarks of James Madison at the Virginia ratify-
ing convention); Letter from Timothy Pickering, to Charles Tillinghast (Dec. 24, 1787), 
reprinted in 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 193, 196–97 (claiming that Con-
gress would have nothing to gain from abusive regulations, that it would cost Senate and 
President their seats).  
161 THE FEDERALIST NO. 60 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 114, at 27 (reporting remarks 
by Theophilus Parsons at the Massachusetts ratifying convention). 
162 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 61 (quoting William Davie at the North Carolina 
ratifying convention, “Congress has ultimately no power over elections, but what is pri-
marily given to the state legislatures”). 
163 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 240–41 (recording comments by Rufus King and 
Gouverneur Morris). 
164 E.g., A Friend of Society and Liberty (Tench Coxe), PA. GAZETTE, Jul. 23, 1788, reprinted in 
18 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 277, 280; A Landholder (Oliver Ellsworth), 
Letter IV, Nov. 26, 1787, reprinted in 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 231, 233–
34 (citing the case of Rhode Island); A Pennsylvanian to the New York Convention (Tench 
Coxe), supra note 152, at 1144–45 (citing the case of Rhode Island).  Anti-Federalists re-
sponded that the depiction of Rhode Island’s malefactions was greatly overdrawn.  E.g., 2 
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In New York, for example, Alexander Hamilton developed the 
“congressional self-preservation” argument at length in Number 59 of 
The Federalist.166  He suggested that foreign influence might induce 
some states to try to destroy the central government by sabotaging 
elections for the House of Representatives.167  Hamilton acknowl-
edged that a group of states also could destroy the central govern-
 
ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 23 (reporting remarks by Phanuel Bishop at the Mas-
sachusetts ratifying convention); Agrippa, supra note 132, at 863.  But see id. (reporting 
remarks by Rufus King and Nathaniel Gorham assuring Bishop of the accuracy of the 
charge against Rhode Island, to Bishop’s satisfaction); id. at 24 (reporting remarks of Ca-
leb Strong at the Massachusetts ratifying convention). 
165 E.g., Cassius, Letter VI, MASS. GAZETTE, Dec. 17, 1788, reprinted in 4 DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY, supra note 1, at 423, 425–426 (“What is intended, by saying that Congress shall 
have power to appoint the place for electing representatives, is, only to have a check 
upon the legislature of any state, if they should happen to be composed of villains and 
knaves, as is the case in a sister state; and should take upon themselves to appoint a place 
for choosing delegates to send to Congress; which place might be the most inconvenient 
in the whole state; and for that reason be appointed by the legislature, in order to create 
a disgust [i.e., distaste] in the minds of the people against the federal government, if they 
themselves should dislike it.”).  Besides those mentioned in the text, additional examples 
of Federalist use of this argument were as follows:   
   Massachusetts:  Rufus King and Nathaniel Gorham, Response to Elbridge Gerry’s Objections 
(Nov. 3, 1787), reprinted in FARRAND, SUPPLEMENT, supra note 1, at 280, 281–82. 
 New York: Fabius, ALBANY FED. HERALD, Mar. 17, 1788, reprinted in 20 DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY, supra note 1, at 862, 863 (expressing similar sentiments); Albany Federal Com-
mittee, An Impartial Address (1788), reprinted in 21 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 
1388, 1391; A Pennsylvanian to the New York Convention (Tench Coxe), supra note 152, at 
1145. 
 North Carolina: 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 53–54 (reporting remarks of James 
Iredell at the North Carolina ratifying convention); id. at 59 (reporting remarks of William 
Davie at the North Carolina ratifying convention). 
 Pennsylvania: 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 544 (reporting remarks by Tho-
mas McKean at the Pennsylvania ratifying convention); 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1, 
at 440–41 (reporting remarks by James Wilson at the Pennsylvania ratifying convention). 
 Virginia: 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 9–10 (reporting remarks by George Nicho-
las at the Virginia ratifying convention); id. at 367 (reporting remarks of James Madison in 
the same convention). 
See also Remarker, INDEP. CHRON., Jan. 17, 1788, reprinted in 5 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, su-
pra note 1, at 734, 738 (“[T]he obstinacy of one State might lead them to refuse to elect at 
all.  In others, perhaps, the legislature might abuse the inhabitants, by appointing a place 
for holding the elections, which would prevent some from attending, and burthen others 
with very great inconveniences.”); Letter from Timothy Pickering to Charles Tillinghast 
(Nov. 24, 1787), reprinted in 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 193, 196–97 (ex-
pressing similar sentiments).  A variation of this argument was that congressional power to 
regulate congressional elections was necessary to the independence of Congress.  A Friend 
to Good Government, POUGHKEEPSIE COUNTRY J., Apr. 15, 1788, reprinted in 20 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 917, 918–19. 
166 THE FEDERALIST NO. 59 (Alexander Hamilton), reprinted in 16 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, 
supra note 1, at 185, 186. 
167 Id. at 189. 
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ment by refusing to elect Senators.168  But he pointed out that destroy-
ing the government by refusing to elect Senators would be more dif-
ficult than doing so by refusing to elect members of the House:  The 
terms of only a third of the Senators would expire at any one time, so 
destruction of the upper chamber would take several years.  The 
terms of the entire House expired at once, so that body could be obli-
terated at once.169 
In Maryland, convention delegate James McHenry added that the 
risk to the federal government might not arise from state malice:  An 
insurrection or rebellion might prevent a state legislature from ad-
ministering an election.170  As James Iredell told the North Carolina 
ratifying convention, “[a]n occasion may arise when the exercise of 
this ultimate power in Congress may be necessary . . . if a state should 
be involved in war, and its legislature could not assemble, (as was the 
case of South Carolina, and occasionally of some other states, during 
the late war).”171 
Anti-Federalists observed that the terms of the Times, Places and 
Manner Clause did not limit congressional power to emergency 
use.172  Nevertheless, the congressional self-preservation argument 
seems to have convinced many.  Noah Webster, for one, resorted to it 
 
168 The Anti-Federalist “Federal Farmer” had pointed this out.  Federal Farmer, supra note 
108, at 316 (“Should the state legislatures be disposed to be negligent, or to combine to 
break up congress, they have a very simple way to do it, as the constitution now stands—
they have only to neglect to chuse [sic] senators.”).  It was conceded by former federal 
convention delegate William Davie at the North Carolina ratifying convention.  4 
ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 58. 
169 THE FEDERALIST NO. 59 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 166, at 188 (“But with regard 
to the Fœderal [sic] House of Representatives, there is intended to be a general election 
of members once in two years.”). 
170 James McHenry, Speech Before the Maryland State House of Delegates (Nov. 29, 1787), 
reprinted in 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 279, 282 (stating that the “Conven-
tion had in Contemplation the possible events of Insurrection, Invasion, and even to pro-
vide against any disposition that might occur hereafter in any particular State to thwart 
the measures of the General Government”). 
171 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 53–54. 
172 Luther Martin, Speech Before the Maryland State House of Delegates (Nov. 29, 1787), 
reprinted in 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 285, 289 (stating “if it was in-
tended to relate to the cases of Insurrection or Invasion, why not by express words con-
fine the power to these objects?”).  Of course, the Suspension Clause had been so limited.  
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (“The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be sus-
pended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”); 
see also 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 23, 25 (reporting remarks of Phanuel Bishop 
at the Massachusetts ratifying convention); 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES supra note 1, at 403 (re-
porting remarks of George Mason at the Virginia ratifying convention); 4 ELLIOT’S 
DEBATES supra note 1, at 56–57 (reporting remarks of William Goudy and William McDo-
well at the North Carolina ratifying convention). 
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in a tract in which he reversed his earlier opposition.173  However, the 
congressional-preservation argument carried with it a corollary:  If 
Congress’s power to fix the “Manner of holding Elections” was de-
signed principally to preserve Congress from destruction or serious 
prejudice, then perhaps the power should be construed as applying 
only in situations that threatened destruction or serious prejudice. 
Some Anti-Federalists proposed constitutional amendments to 
write this corollary into the document.174  Notable advocates of the 
Constitution signaled that they would be open to such amend-
ments—among them James Iredell175 and David Ramsey,176 leading 
Federalist spokesmen in North and South Carolina, respectively.  Ac-
cordingly, the ratifying conventions of Massachusetts,177 South Caroli-
na,178 New Hampshire,179 Virginia,180 New York,181 North Carolina,182 
 
173 America (Noah Webster), To the Dissenting Members of the Late Convention of Pennsylvania, 
N.Y. DAILY ADVERTISER, Dec. 31, 1787, reprinted in 15 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 
1, at 194, 195 (stating “the time and manner of exercising that right [election] are very 
wisely vested in Congress, otherwise a delinquent State might embarrass the measures of 
the Union.  The safety of the public requires that the Federal body should prevent any 
particular delinquency”). 
174 Supra note 132; see also 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 552 (reproducing an 
amendment proposed by the minority at the Maryland Ratifying Convention, “[t]hat the 
Congress shall have no power to alter or change the time, place, or manner of holding 
elections for senators or representatives, unless a state shall neglect to make regulations, 
or to execute its regulations, or shall be prevented by invasion or rebellion; in which cases 
only, Congress may interfere, until the cause be removed”). 
175 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 54 (“I should, therefore, not object to the recom-
mendation of an amendment similar to that of other states—that this power in Congress 
should only be exercised when a state legislature neglected or was disabled from making 
the regulations required.”). 
176 Letter from David Ramsey to Benjamin Rush, supra note 141, at 84 (“If the clause which 
gives Congress power to interfere with the State regulations for electing members of their 
body was . . . altered so as to confine that power simply to the cases in which the States 
omitted to make any regulations on the subject I should be better pleased.”). 
177 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 177, reprinted in 16 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra 
note 1, at 68 (quoting Massachusetts amendments). 
178 18 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 71–72 (“Whereas it is essential to the preserva-
tion of the rights reserved to the several states, and the freedom of the people under the 
operations of a general government that the right of prescribing the manner, time and 
places of holding the elections to the federal legislature, should be for ever inseparably 
annexed to the sovereignty of the several states.  This Convention doth declare, that the 
same ought to remain to all posterity a perpetual and fundamental right in the local, ex-
clusive of the interference of the general government, except in cases where the legisla-
tures of the states shall refuse or neglect to perform and fulfill the same, according to the 
tenor of the said constitution.”). 
179 18 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 187–88 (“That Congress do not exercise the 
powers vested in them by the 4th section of the first article, but in cases when a state shall 
neglect or refuse to make the regulations therein mentioned, or shall make regulations 
contrary to a free and equal representation.”). 
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and Rhode Island183 all proposed such amendments.  The Massachu-
setts amendment is illustrative: 
That Congress do not exercise the powers vested in them by the 4th sec-
tion of the 1st article but in cases where a state shall neglect or refuse to 
make regulations therein mentioned, or shall make regulations subver-
sive of the rights of the people to a free and equal representation in 
Congress, agreeably to the constitution.184 
Leading Federalists argued that, even without amendment, the 
Clause should be construed as limited to emergencies.  Alexander 
Contee Hanson, a member of Congress whose pamphlet supporting 
the Constitution proved popular,185 stated flatly that Congress would 
exercise its times, places, and manner authority only in cases of inva-
sion, legislative neglect or obstinate refusal to pass election laws, or if 
a state crafted its election laws with a “sinister purpose” or to injure 
the general government.  “It was never meant,” Hanson wrote, “that 
congress should at any time interfere, unless on the failure of a state 
 
180 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 661, reprinted in 18 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra 
note 1, at 205 (“That Congress shall not alter, modify, or interfere in the times, places, or 
manner of holding elections for senators and representatives, or either of them, except 
when the legislature of any state shall neglect, refuse, or be disabled, by invasion or rebel-
lion, to prescribe the same.”). 
181 The New York ratification instrument provided as follows: 
[T]hat the Congress shall not make or alter any Regulation in any State respecting 
the times places and manner of holding Elections for Senators or Representatives, 
unless the Legislature of such State shall neglect or refuse to make Laws or Regu-
lations for the purpose, or from any circumstance be incapable of making the 
same; and then only until the Legislature of such State shall make provision in the 
Premises; provided that Congress may prescribe the time for the Election of Rep-
resentatives. 
  Ratification of the Constitution by the State of New York (July 26, 1788), available at 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/ratny.asp. 
182 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 249 (“The Congress shall not alter, modify, or inter-
fere in the times, places, or manner, of holding elections for senators and representatives, 
or either of them, except when the legislature of any state shall neglect, refuse, or be dis-
abled by invasion or rebellion, to prescribe the same.”). 
183 The Rhode Island ratification instrument provided as follows: 
Congress shall not alter, modify or interfere in the times, places or manner of hold-
ing elections for Senators and Representatives, or either of them, except when the 
legislature of any state shall neglect, refuse or be disabled by invasion or rebellion 
to prescribe the same; or in case when the provision made by the states, is so imper-
fect as that no consequent election is had, and then only until the legislature of 
such state, shall make provision in the premises. 
  Ratification of the Constitution by the State of Rhode Island (May 29, 1790), available at 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/ratri.asp. 
184 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 177, reprinted in 16 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra 
note 1, at 68 (quoting Massachusetts amendments). 
185 On March 27, 1788, Hanson wrote to Tench Coxe of “the avidity, with which I am in-
formed my humble essay has been bought up.”  Letter from Alexander Contee Hanson to 
Tench Coxe (Mar. 27, 1788), in 8 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 520, 521 (in-
ternal citations omitted). 
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legislature, or to alter such regulations as may be obviously impro-
per.”186 
Federalist Jasper Yeates made a similar representation to the 
Pennsylvania ratifying convention:  “Sir, let it be remembered that 
this power can only operate in a case of necessity, after the factious or 
listless disposition of a particular state has rendered an interference 
essential to the salvation of the general government.”187  John Jay im-
plied as much at the New York convention.188 
Accordingly, the ratifying conventions of three states—New 
York,189 North Carolina,190 and Rhode Island191—adopted resolutions 
of understanding limiting the scope. 
 
186 Aristides (Alexander Contee Hanson), Remarks on the Proposed Plan (Jan. 31, 1788), re-
printed in 15 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 522, 526. 
187 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 437 (reporting remarks by Jasper Yeates at the 
Pennsylvania ratifying convention). 
188 2 Elliot’s Debates, supra note 1, at 326 (“Suppose that, by design or accident, the  states 
should neglect to appoint representatives; certainly there should be some constitutional 
remedy for this evil.  The obvious meaning of the paragraph was, that, if this neglect 
should take place, Congress should have power, by law, to support the government, and 
prevent the dissolution of the Union.  He believed this was the design of the federal Con-
vention.”)  
189 The New York ratifying convention resolved as follows: 
In full Confidence . . . that the Congress will not make or alter any Regulation in 
this State respecting the times places and manner of holding Elections for Sena-
tors or Representatives unless the Legislature of this State shall neglect or refuse to 
make Laws or regulations for the purpose, or from any circumstance be incapable 
of making the same, and that in those cases such power will only be exercised until 
the Legislature of this State shall make provision in the Premises. 
  Ratification of the Constitution by the State of New York (July 26, 1788), available at 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/ratny.asp.  The New York convention added 
this paragraph as well: 
WE the Delegates of the People of the State of New York . . . [d]o declare and 
make known. . . . That nothing contained in the said Constitution is to be con-
strued to prevent the Legislature of any State from passing Laws at its discretion 
from time to time to divide such State into convenient Districts, and to apportion 
its Representatives to and amongst such Districts. 
  Id.; see also 18 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 301–02. 
190 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 246 (“That Congress shall not alter, modify, or inter-
fere in the times, places, or manner of holding elections for senators and representatives, 
or either of them, except when the legislature of any state shall neglect, refuse or be dis-
abled by invasion or rebellion, to prescribe the same.”). 
191 The Rhode Island ratification instrument stated in part: 
We the said delegates . . . ratify . . . .[i]n full confidence nevertheless . . . [t]hat the 
Congress will not make or alter any regulation in this State, respecting the times, 
places and manner of holding elections for senators or representatives, unless the 
legislature of this state shall neglect, or refuse to make laws or regulations for the 
purpose, or from any circumstance be incapable of making the same; and that n 
[sic] those cases, such power will only be exercised, until the legislature of this 
State shall make provision in the Premises. 
  Ratification of the Constitution by the State of Rhode Island (May 29, 1790), available at 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/ratri.asp. 
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C.  Observations on the Ratification Debates:  The Original Understanding 
With respect to other federal powers granted in the proposed 
Constitution, Anti-Federalists made exaggerated claims as to the 
scope of federal authority.192  But their claims about the substantive 
power granted by the Times, Places and Manner Clause were more 
limited.  That is, the Anti-Federalists assumed that the Clause enabled 
Congress only to adopt regulations customarily associated with regu-
lating the “manner of election”—including a few denied by the con-
stitutional text.  Anti-Federalists did not suggest that the provision 
would empower Congress to tax anyone, or regulate speech or the 
press, or adopt a comprehensive criminal code, or favor some reli-
gions over others, or control finances.  All of their scenarios were 
based on apprehensions about how Congress might manipulate the 
date and place of elections, the composition of legislative districts, 
the form of the vote, and the rules of decision.  This strongly suggests 
that all sides understood the Clause to authorize Congress to do 
nothing outside the scope of accepted “manner” regulation. 
This inference is supported further by other remarks made by 
leading figures throughout the Founding Era.  At the federal conven-
tion, James Madison characterized “times, places & manner” as 
“words of great latitude,” but cited only examples of standard man-
ner-of-election rules.193  During the ratification fight, Tench Coxe 
cited as an example of the “Manner of holding” only the choice of vi-
va voce or secret ballot voting.194  During the first session of the First 
Congress, Senator William Maclay referred to the “mode” of congres-
sional voting as viva voce or by ballot.195  During the same session, 
 
192 For example, the Anti-Federalists portrayed the Necessary and Proper Clause, U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18, and the General Welfare Clause, id., art. I, § 8, cl. 1, as having 
very great sweep.  See Robert G. Natelson, The Framing and Adoption of the Necessary and 
Proper Clause, in LAWSON, ET AL., ORIGINS, supra note 1, at 94–96 (summarizing Anti-
Federalist claims about the Necessary and Proper Clause); Robert G. Natelson, The Gener-
al Welfare Clause and the Public Trust:  An Essay in Original Understanding, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 
1, 30–38 (2003) (summarizing Anti-Federalist claims about the General Welfare Clause). 
193 At the federal convention, James Madison said of what became the Times, Places and 
Manner Clause: 
These were words of great latitude. . . . Whether the electors should vote by ballot 
or vivâ voce[sic], should assemble at this place or that place; should be divided in-
to districts or all meet at one place, shd [sic] all vote for all the representatives; or 
all in a district vote for a number allotted to the district; these & many other points 
would depend on the [state] Legislatures. 
  2 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 1, at 240–41. 
194 Tench Coxe, supra note 152, at 1145. 
195 The Diary of William Maclay and Other Notes on Senate Debates (Kenneth R. Bowling & Helen 
E. Veit eds., 1988), in 9 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 81 (Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 1988). 
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Representative Aedanus Burke unsuccessfully proposed a constitu-
tional amendment to limit the Times, Places and Manner Clause to 
emergencies.196  During the ensuing floor discussion, the only exam-
ples given of congressional power under the Clause were deciding be-
tween secret ballot and viva voce voting,197 fixing polling places,198 and 
legislative districting.199 
The real Founding-Era debate over the Clause, therefore, was not 
about whether it gave Congress unfamiliar powers.  It was over three 
other issues.  The first was whether the Clause granted Congress 
some traditional “manner” powers (over terms of office and voter and 
candidate qualifications) actually denied by other provisions of the 
Constitution.  The second issue was whether Congress would abuse 
the authority that all conceded Congress would enjoy under the 
Clause:  Would Congress hold elections on days convenient for all?  
Would it choose polling places and draw legislative districts fairly?  
Would it replace secret ballot voting with viva voce voting or majority-
victor rules with plurality rules?200 
The third issue was whether the Clause granted Congress authori-
ty to act in non-emergency situations.  Anti-Federalists said it did.  
Some Federalists thought so, some not.  A limiting amendment would 
have resolved this question authoritatively, and several states pro-
posed such amendments, but none was adopted.201  Yet in several key 
states, ratification was secured only after Federalists represented that 
the Clause was limited to emergencies, and three state conventions 
ratified only on the explicit understanding that the Clause was so li-
mited.202 
While the ratifying conventions’ resolutions of understanding are 
not absolutely binding determinants of the Clause’s legal effect, those 
resolutions—especially when coupled with Federalist representations 
in key states such as Pennsylvania—are persuasive evidence of how 
 
196 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 768 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834). 
197 Id. at 798 (quoting Rep. Elbridge Gerry).  Another example:  Richard Symmes, a young 
Massachusetts lawyer (and a moderate Anti-Federalist who eventually voted for the Con-
stitution in his state’s ratifying convention), thought of “manner” mostly in terms of viva 
voce or secret ballot voting.  Letter from William Symmes, Jr. to Peter Osgood, Jr., supra 
note 129, at 110. 
198 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 799 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (quoting Rep. Elbridge Gerry). 
199 Id. at 801 (quoting Rep. Thomas Tudor Tucker). 
200 E.g., 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 60 (reporting remarks by William Davie at the 
North Carolina ratifying convention:  “At present, the manner of electing is different in 
different states.  Some elect by ballot, and others viva voce.  It will be more convenient to 
have the manner uniform in all the states”). 
201 Supra notes 177–183. 
202 Supra notes 185–88 and accompanying text. 
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the Clause should be construed.  Indeed, the Supreme Court often 
considers such evidence in deciding whether to interpret a provision 
narrowly or broadly.203  In the case of the Times, Places and Manner 
Clause, many of the leading Founders—Federalists and Anti-
Federalists alike—were gravely concerned about the danger that a 
self-dealing Congress might abuse its “manner of election” power.  In 
response, leading Federalists represented that the power could not be 
used except in cases of serious need.  If not for such representations, 
the Constitution may never have been ratified.  Of course, others may 
point out that the “emergency only” rule was never formally written 
into the Constitution, presumably because some people thought it 
was undesirable and others thought the ratification-era understand-
ing made it unnecessary.  Perhaps the best way to balance these con-
cerns is not to apply a literal “emergencies only” limitation, but to 
construe the grant of congressional authority narrowly, so that doubts 
as to the scope of the power are resolved against coverage.  That cer-
tainly was the least for which the skeptical ratifiers bargained. 
V.  CONCLUSION:  IMPLICATIONS FOR MODERN “MANNER” LEGISLATION 
Historical evidence does not always offer clear guidance on the 
constitutionality of modern legislation, but in this case, it does.  The 
Times, Places and Manner Clause gave Congress authority to regulate 
the manner of election within the widely accepted meaning of that 
concept, excepting only the qualifications of electors and candidates, 
the terms of office, and the places for electing Senators.  The grant of 
power to set “Times” enabled Congress to establish the dates and 
hours for federal elections.  The grant of power to determine “Places” 
authorized Congress to fix the locations for voting for Representa-
tives and the contours of congressional districts.  The “Manner of 
holding” grant bestowed the residuum of manner-of-election regula-
tion.  It conferred authority over voter registration,204 appointment 
 
203 Thus, the Court interprets the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
more broadly in cases of race than in other sorts of cases because that Amendment’s rati-
fication history shows that its core purpose was to assure racial equality.  ERWIN 
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:  PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 695 (3d ed. 2006) (dis-
cussing justifications for strict scrutiny analysis of race classifications).  Similarly, the 
Court has developed the “dormant commerce clause” branch of Commerce Clause inter-
pretation because of the historical purposes behind the Commerce Clause and allied 
provisions.  Id. at 421–22 (discussing the Framers’ intent to “prevent state laws that inter-
fered with interstate commerce” as justification for the dormant commerce clause). 
204 E.g., The Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140 (imposing penalties for obstruc-
tion of voting rights and allowing use of military force to enforce the law). 
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and qualifications of election administrators,205 delineation of the 
form of the ballot and the method of voting,206 notices and deadlines, 
rules of decision (majority or plurality), procedures for resolving con-
tests, and punishment of crimes in election administration.207  The 
“Manner of holding” grant further authorized regulation of two-tier 
election procedures, which surely included governance of primary as 
well as general elections.208 
Authority over the normal conduct of political campaigns209 was 
outside the accepted scope of “manner-of-election” regulation.  As 
such, that authority was outside the power literally conferred by the 
Times, Places and Manner Clause.  Congress could regulate cam-
paigns, therefore, only if campaign regulation qualified as an inci-
dental power under the Necessary and Proper Clause. 
Then, as now, campaigns affected elections.  Under the law of the 
time, however, for a power to qualify as incidental required more 
than an effect or other factual connection between the incidental 
and principal power.  The law also required that the putative incident 
be less (in the language of the day) “worthy” than the principal. 210  In 
other words, regulation of the outside activity had to be less impor-
tant—less socially or economically significant—than regulation of the 
principal activity.  Moreover, the agent claiming a power was inciden-
tal had to demonstrate either that the lesser power was a customary 
way of carrying out the principal power or, alternatively, that inability 
to exercise the incidental power would result in great prejudice to the 
exercise of the principal power.211  These requirements served the ul-
timate purpose of assuring that the claimed incident was within the 
 
205 E.g., The Force Act of 1871, ch. 99, 16 Stat. 433 (banning the use of terror, force, or bri-
bery to prevent citizens from voting). 
206 E.g., Help America Vote Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 2, 5, 36, and 42 U.S.C.) (requiring states to replace 
punch card and lever voting and imposing federal standards for voting systems and in-
structions). 
207 E.g., ch. 114, 16 Stat. at 433. 
208 Cf. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 315–21 (1941) (upholding such regulations).  
There is an irony here:  By far the Supreme Court’s most thorough analysis of the Found-
ing-Era meaning of the Times, Places and Manner Clause is Justice McReynold’s opinion 
in Newberry.  Yet because the opinion did not examine contemporaneous usages of the 
term “manner of election,” it reached the wrong conclusion (i.e., holding that Congress 
could not regulate federal primary elections). 
209 The normal conduct of political campaigns was not understood to include corrupting the 
election machinery by direct bribery of voters or election officials.  See supra note 73. 
210 The discussion in this part generally follows the discussion in Robert G. Natelson, The 
Legal Origins of the Necessary and Proper Clause, in LAWSON, ET AL., ORIGINS, supra note 1, at 
52–83. 
211 Id. at 61. 
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actual or presumed intent of the grantors.212  Founding-Era lawyers 
sometimes summed these requirements by saying that an incident 
could not be a “different thing” or have a “different nature” from its 
principal. 
Consider a hypothetical federal law altering the composition of 
state legislatures.  Since under the unamended Constitution state leg-
islatures elected United States Senators, this law might affect the elec-
tion of Senators; indeed, it might be designed to do so.  The factual 
connection, however, would not have rendered the power to pass 
such a law incidental to the express power to regulate the “Manner of 
holding” senatorial elections.  Altering the composition of state legis-
latures would have been seen as a “different thing” having a “differ-
ent nature” from the principal power, and thus not within the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause. 
The governance of congressional campaigns was similarly outside 
the scope of incidental congressional power.213  Governance of con-
gressional campaigns is an endeavor at least as ambitious as (as “wor-
thy” as) regulating election mechanics:  It is a more complicated en-
terprise, entailing the regulation of far more resources than are 
devoted to mere election administration.  Furthermore, even if cam-
paign governance were deemed less “worthy” than election adminis-
tration, Founding-Era law would require a showing either of a custo-
mary connection between campaign regulation and manner-of-
election regulation or of “great prejudice” to the former from absence 
of the latter.  However, the eighteenth-century materials reveal no 
customary or legal connection between campaign rules and manner-
of-election regulation.  To be sure, campaign discourse was a subject 
of legal governance, but that governance was carried out through the 
wholly separate area of defamation law214—a subject the Federalists 
explicitly assured the ratifying public was reserved exclusively for 
state, not federal, oversight. 
The absence of a customary connection thus leaves one to argue 
that without the power to regulate campaigns, Congress would suffer 
“great prejudice” in the administration of electoral mechanics.  This 
is a difficult case to make, since unfair advertising and unrestricted 
 
212 Id. at 66, 82–83. 
213 That is, other than by expulsion from Congress of the offending candidate.  See U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 (empowering each chamber of Congress to expel a member “with 
the Concurrence of two-thirds”). 
214 On the eighteenth-century law of defamation, see, for example, ANONYMOUS, A DIGEST 
OF THE LAW CONCERNING LIBELS (W. Owen et al. eds., 1770) and 3 MATTHEW BACON, A 
NEW ABRIDGMENT OF THE LAW 490–98 (John Exshaw ed. 1781). 
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campaign spending do not greatly impede the conduct of such oper-
ations as erecting polling booths, maintaining voter registration lists, 
or counting the ballots.  In any event, the ratifiers clearly informed 
future generations how to resolve such questions:  The power of 
Congress to regulate its own elections is a power that, while necessary 
to address unusual situations, nevertheless invites self-dealing and 
abuse.  In cases of doubt, it must be narrowly construed.215 
 
215 Supra text accompanying note 202. 
